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Abstract
We study the problem of stochastic stability for evolutionary dynamics under the logit dy-
namics. For paths escaping from a given equilibrium—also called a convention— positive
feedback implies that along the most likely escape paths the agents always deviate from the
status quo convention strategy. In addition, the relative strengths of the positive feedback
effects imply that deviations from the status quo convention to another convention must oc-
cur consecutively in the most likely escape paths. By combining these two effects, we prove
that the most likely escape paths can consist only of repeated identical mistakes of agents
switching from the status quo convention to some other convention. As an application of our
result, we determine stochastically stable conventions for evolutionary bargaining models of
the Nash demand game. We show that the Nash bargaining solution arises as the long run
convention under the usual logit choice rule (called here the unintentional logit dynamic).
We also obtain a new bargaining solution if the logit choice rule is combined with intentional
idiosyncratic (non-best response) plays (called here the intentional logit dynamic). This new
bargaining solution under the intentional logit dynamic is more egalitarian than the Nash
bargaining solution, demonstrating that intentionality implies equality under the logit choice
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1. Introduction
Conventions or social norms that form over time and last in the long run are frequently
modeled as long run equilibria in stochastic evolutionary dynamics, in which agents play best
responses subject to mistakes, errors, or idiosyncratic plays (Young, 1993a; Kandori et al.,
1993; Bowles, 2004). For example, Young (1998a) shows that a bargaining norm among
only minimally forward-looking agents with limited information approximates the Kalai–
Smorodinsky solution—a highly rational and axiomatic cooperative bargaining solution.
Finding the most likely evolutionary paths escaping from an existing convention or tran-
sitioning among conventions serves as a key step in understanding the disruption and emer-
gence of these conventions.
Recently, one of the behavioral rules of myopic agents, the logit choice model, has be-
come popular among researchers because of its empirical plausibility as well as its analytic
convenience1. Under the logit choice rule, the probability of an agent’s mistake decreases
log-linearly in the payoff losses incurred by such a mistake and, hence, depends on a popula-
tion state through payoffs. In the widely used uniform mistake model, in which all possible
mistakes are equally likely, the more likely path can easily be determined by comparing the
number of mistakes involved and, hence, the lengths of paths2. However, under the logit
choice rule, determining the most likely path is far from obvious, because the probability
of a path depends on the kinds of mistakes involved as well as on the length of the path.
For example, Hwang and Newton (2016) provides an example in which two different kinds
of sub-optimal plays are involved in the most likely escape path from a convention under a
finite population logit model (see Example 1 in Hwang and Newton (2016)).
As a result, there has been a growing interest in determining the optimal evolutionary
paths from one convention to another under the logit choice rule. Among others, two notable
studies address these questions (see also cited references in footnote 1). Hwang and Newton
(2016) study two population coordination evolutionary models with zero off-diagonal payoffs
and an arbitrary number of strategies, for both finite and infinite populations. Sandholm and Staudigl
(2016) study one population coordination evolutionary model with three strategies under an
infinite population limit. More extensive discussion of these papers follows later. Though
both these studies provide useful characterizations, their results are limited to specific classes
of games (either three strategy games or games with zero off-diagonal payoffs) and a specific
1Blume (1993) introduced the logit choice rule to the economics literature. Recently, Kreindler and Young
(2013), Alo´s-Ferrer and Netzer (2010), and Okada and Tercieux (2012) studied problems related to fast
convergence, various revision rules, and local potentials, respectively, under the logit choice rule. Staudigl
(2012) studies two strategy, two population models and Hwang et al. (2016) study bargaining problems
by combining intentional idiosyncratic plays and the logit choice rule. The previously cited studies of
Young and Burke (2001) and Belloc and Bowles (2013) also use the logit choice model.
2For example, see Kandori et al. (1993)
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kind of model (one population or two population models). For example, the interesting
question of how to analyze the evolutionary bargaining model of the Nash demand game
(Nash, 1953) under the logit choice rule remains unanswered (see Section 4).
We develop new methods, which we call “comparison principles,” in order to overcome
the limitations of the existing works and reduce the computational burdens in finding the
most likely evolutionary paths. We find that under the logit choice rule, positive feedback
of agents (to coordinate) plays a key role. Kandori and Rob (1998) introduce the “marginal
bandwagon property” to capture the positive feedback aspect of a network externality, re-
quiring that the advantage of strategy i over j is greater when the other player is playing
strategy i. In stochastic evolutionary game theory, the (un-)likeliness of a path is measured
by a quantity called the “cost”: the less costly a path is, the more likely is the transition
induced by that path. We show that for the finite population models with the logit choice
rule, (i) positive feedback (defined by the marginal bandwagon property) implies that along
the minimum cost escape paths from a status quo convention, agents always deviate first
from the status quo convention strategy before deviating from other strategies (Proposition
3.1), and (ii) the relative strength of the positive feedback effects implies that the transi-
tions from the status quo convention to another convention must occur repeatedly in the
cost optimal escape paths (Proposition 3.3).
Our first step (i) (Proposition 3.1) of comparing paths to show that agents switch first
from the status quo convention strategy generalize the approach in Hwang and Newton
(2016). Similarly to the current study, Hwang and Newton (2016) exploit, though implic-
itly, the cost comparison arguments by constructing a lower bound function (see Section 5
in the cited paper). However, the arguments presented by Hwang and Newton (2016) dif-
fer from the current ones, as follows. First, in Hwang and Newton (2016) cost estimations
of the constructed lower bound functions are possible only because all off-diagonal payoffs
are zeros and because the cost functions are (multi-) linear with respect to the populations
states. Second, the lower bound function constructed in Hwang and Newton (2016) does not
correspond to an actual path and, thus, the method does not provide guidance for how to
construct a similar lower bound function for games other than those with zero off-diagonal
payoffs. Their arguments thus cannot be applied to games with nonzero off-diagonal payoffs
(e.g., the Nash demand game) or single population models in which the cost function of a
path is quadratic with respect to population states. In other words, the cited paper cannot
identify the conditions for games that ensure that cost comparisons of paths are possible. In
contrast, under the condition of the marginal bandwagon property, our comparison methods
are used to construct a lower cost path for a given arbitrary path in the state space (i.e., the
simplex) and our arguments can be applied to any coordination games with the marginal
bandwagon property.
We then apply our results, (i) and (ii) (Proposition 3.1 and Proposition 3.3, respec-
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tively), to the exit problem—the problem of finding a cost minimum path escaping from
a convention—under finite population models, and we characterize the candidates for the
cost minimizing paths, as follows. The candidates consist of (possibly) different kinds of the
repeated identical mistakes deviating from the status quo convention strategy (Proposition
3.4). Finally, to pin down the exact minimum path, we consider the infinite population limit
as in Sandholm and Staudigl (2016) and we show that the least unlikely escape paths from
the status quo convention involve only one kind of repeated identical mistakes of agents
(Theorem 3.1). This result holds for any coordination games satisfying the marginal band-
wagon properties with an arbitrary number of strategies, regardless of one or two populations.
To the best of our knowledge, this result is new to the existing literature.
The step of taking the infinite population is the same as the second limit taken by
Sandholm and Staudigl (2016). These authors derive continuous optimal control problems
by taking, first, a zero error rate limit and then, an infinite population limit (called the “dou-
ble limit”). Then they solve the resulting control problems for exit and stochastic stability.
This method, while providing a systematic approach to tackling these problems, requires
solving a (possibly challenging) Hamilton-Jacobi equation associated with the optimal con-
trol problem. To solve the equation, they embed the control problem over the simplex (the
state space) to the problem over an affine subset of the usual Euclidean space. Here, the
difficulty is that the controlled trajectories may not stay in the simplex for games with more
than three strategy games. Therefore, their results do not extend to more than three strat-
egy games. In contrast, we first study a finite population model, in which our approach
of constructing an alternative path bypasses this difficulty, because the constructed path,
by the comparison principles, always lies in the simplex. In this way, we eliminate a very
significant number of irrelevant paths for the finite population models, and we obtain results
for the exit problem for games with an arbitrary number of strategies.
As an application of our main result, we study the evolutionary bargaining solution for the
Nash demand games and show that the Nash bargaining solution arises as the stochastically
stable convention under the usual logit choice rule (called here the unintentional logit dy-
namic). We also obtain a new bargaining solution when the logit choice rule is combined with
intentional idiosyncratic (non-best response) plays (called the intentional logit dynamic). By
the intentional idiosyncratic plays, we mean that agents always experiment with strategies
under which they would do better, should that strategy induce a convention Naidu et al.
(2010); Hwang et al. (2016). We show that the new solution under the intentional logit dy-
namics is more egalitarian than the Nash bargaining solution, hence intentionality implies
equality (Proposition 4.1). The reason for equality is as follows: under the unintentional
logit rule, some transitions from the egalitarian convention (the equal division convention)
to the Nash bargaining convention (the unequal division convention) are driven by a popula-
tion who stands to lose by such transitions. Under the intentional logit rule, every transition
is driven by the population who stands to benefit. Thus some unfavorable transitions lead-
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ing to the Nash bargaining convention are replaced by favorable transitions to the deviant
population, leading to a more equal convention than the Nash bargaining convention.
Our analysis also has the following benefits. First, our results for finite populations
are useful in applications, because the well-known waiting time issues related to stochastic
evolutionary games become more severe when the size of the population approaches infinity
(see e.g. Ellison (1993)). Also, the finite population model is considered to be more difficult
to analyze than the infinite population approximation because of complications caused by
the negligible probabilities of mistakes in the scale of population size. However, we find
that retaining the finite population structures, and studying them, unexpectedly eases the
difficulty of analyzing the infinite population approximation. Second, our idea of identifying
simple paths to develop comparison principles is related to the cycle decomposition of the
state space in the literature on statistical mechanics (Schnakenberg, 1976). We decompose
the state space into simple cycles to compare the costs of paths. It can be easily seen that our
comparison principle as well as our remaining arguments for the logit choice rule hold for the
uniform mistake models under the assumption of the marginal bandwagon property. Thus,
our method of decomposition and our comparison principles provides a unified framework
for analyzing evolutionary dynamics, including the uniform mistake and logit models. In the
conclusion section, we explain how a similar analysis may be possible for different mistake
models as well.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic setup and discusses,
in some detail, an example illustrating our methods. We present our main results for the
exit problem for one population model in Section 3. In Section 4 we present results for two
population model and analyze the Nash demand game. To streamline the presentation, we
focus on the exit problem in the main text. In the Appendix, we show that our result for
the exit problem can be used to study the stochastic stability problem (Appendix C.1) and
that our comparison method can also be directly applied to the stochastic stability problem
for three strategy games (Appendix C.2). The Appendix provides the technical details and
proofs of the results.
2. Stochastic Evolutionary Dynamics: Setup and Example
2.1. Basic setup: one population model
Consider one population of n agents matched to play a symmetric coordination game
with strategy set S = {1, 2, · · · , |S|} and payoff matrix A. We consider a coordination game
in which every strategy is a strict Nash equilibrium (see Condition A in Section 3). The
population state is described as a vector of fractions of agents using each strategy; that is,
the state of the population is x ∈ ∆(n), where ∆(n) is the simplex
∆(n) := {(x1, · · · , x|S|) ∈
1
n
Z
|S| :
∑
i
x(i) = 1, x(i) ≥ 0 for all }.
The expected payoff to an agent who chooses strategy i at population state x is given by
pi(i, x) :=
∑
j∈S Aijx(j).
We consider a discrete time strategy updating process, defined as follows. At each period,
a randomly chosen agent selects a new strategy. The new population state induced by the
agent’s switching from strategy i to j is denoted by xi,j and the state induced by two agents’
transitions, first from i to j and then from k to l, is denoted by x(i,j)(k,l). More precisely,
xi,j := x+
1
n
(ej − ei), and x
(i,j)(k,l) := x+
1
n
(ej − ei) +
1
e
(el − ek), (1)
where eh is the h-th element of the standard basis for R
|S|. The conditional probability that
an agent with strategy i chooses new strategy j given population state x is specified by the
logit choice rule (Blume, 1993),
Logit choice rule: p
(n)
β (j|i, x) =
exp(βpi(j, x))∑
l exp(βpi(l, x))
, (2)
where β > 0 is a positive parameter interpreted as the degree of rationality (or noise level).
That is, as β increases to ∞, equation (2) converges to the so-called best-response rule,
whereas as β decreases to 0, equation (2) converges to a choice rule that assigns equal prob-
abilities to each strategy—namely, a pure randomization rule. For finite β, the probability
of choosing strategy j increases because the agent expects a higher payoff from strategy j
than she does from other strategies.
The transition probabilities for the updating dynamics are
P
(n)
β (x, x
i,j) = x(i)p
(n)
β (j|i, x)
for i 6= j, where factor x(i) accounts for the fact that at each period, one agent is randomly
chosen to revise her strategy. The unlikeliness of a transition in stochastic evolutionary game
theory is measured by the cost, c(n)(x, y), between two states, x, y which is defined as:
c(n)(x, y) :=


− limβ→∞
lnP
(n)
β
(x,y)
β
if y = xi,j for some i, j, i 6= j
0 if y = x
∞ otherwise
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which becomes
c(n)(x, xi,j) = max{pi(l, x) : l ∈ S} − pi(j, x) (3)
under the logit choice rule (2). When β is sufficiently large, we have P
(n)
β (x, y) ≍ e
−βc(n)(x,y)
and thus the cost between x and y, c(n)(x, y), is the exponential rate of decay of the proba-
bility of transition from x to y. In equation (3), the first term max{pi(l, x) : l ∈ S} is equal
to the payoff pi(m¯, x) for agents playing a best response m¯ in the population state x, and
the second term is the payoff to agents playing the new strategy, j. Thus, when a strategy-
revising agent adopts the best response m¯, the cost of such an action is zero. However, when
she adopts a sub-optimal strategy j 6= m¯ the cost is the payoff loss due to choosing this
strategy instead of the best response. By comparison, under the uniform mistake model,
c(n)(x, xi,j) = 1 if j 6= m¯ and c(n)(x, xi,j) = 0 if j = m¯; that is the cost in the uniform mistake
model is state independent.
A convention is defined as a state in which every agent plays the same strategy which
is a strict Nash equilibrium of A. Thus, x is a convention if x = em¯ for some strategy m¯,
which is a strict Nash equilibrium strategy (recall that ei is the i-th element of the standard
basis of R|S|). Focusing our attention on one such convention, we refer to convention m¯ as
a status quo convention. A path γ is a sequence of states, γ := (x1, x2, · · · , xT ), such that
xt+1 = (xt)
i,j for some i, j and for all t, and we define the cost of a path as the sum of the
costs of the transitions between the states in equation (3), i.e.
I(n)(γ) :=
T−1∑
t=1
c(n)(xt, xt+1). (4)
Next, recall the marginal bandwagon property (MBP) introduced by Kandori and Rob
(1998). A symmetric game with payoff matrix A satisfies the MBP if
Aii −Aji > Aik − Ajk for all distinct i, j, k. (5)
The condition in (5) says that the advantage of playing strategy i over strategy j is greater
when the other player plays strategy i rather than another strategy k. In our population
dynamic model, this implies a positive feedback effect in which the marginal advantage of
switching into strategy i increases in the number of agents adopting strategy i. We also
consider coordination games in which Aii > Aji for all i, j, and we assume the existence of
mixed-strategy Nash equilibria supported on any arbitrary subset of the set of strategies S.
Condition A: The one-population game with payoff matrix A is a coordination game (i.e.,
Aii > Aji for all i, j), it satisfies the marginal bandwagon property MBP, (see eq. (5)), and
for any T ⊂ S, there exists a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium with support T .
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We define the basin of attraction of em¯, D
(n)(em¯), as follows:
D(n)(em¯) : = {x ∈ ∆
(n) : pi(m¯, x) ≥ pi(k, x) for all k } .
In fact, if x belongs to D(n)(em¯), the cost of a transition from i to j is
c(n)(x, xi,j) = pi(m¯, x)− pi(j, x) (6)
for i 6= j. If j = m¯, the cost in equation (6) is zero, and the MBP implies that convention
m¯ can be reached from any x ∈ D(n)(em¯) at no cost; thus, D
(n)(em¯) is indeed the basin
of attraction of convention m¯. Observe that the requirement for the existence of mixed-
strategy Nash equilibria with arbitrary support implies the existence of the distinctive basins
of attraction for all pure strategies. Using this setup, we next present a simple example of a
three-strategy game to illustrate the main ideas and results of the paper.
2.2. Illustration of the main results
Consider a technology choice game consisting of three technologies indexed by 1, 2, and
3, respectively. For example, for PC operating systems, consider Windows, OSX, and Linux.
Let bi be the benefit of technology i that the user obtains when interacting with another user
of the same technology; thus, bi is related to the inherent quality of technology i. Suppose
that the user of technology i experiences some utility or disutility when interacting with
users of a different technology. For the sake of simplicity, the users of technologies 2, 3, and
1 derive utility d when interacting with the users of technologies 1, 2, and 3, respectively. By
the same token, the users of technologies 1, 2, and 3 experience disutility d when interacting
with the users of technologies 2, 3, and 1, respectively. In summary, the payoff matrix is
given by
A =

 b1 −d dd b2 −d
−d d b3

 . (7)
In the context of the technology choice game, we are interested in the positive feedback ef-
fects, where the advantages of a technology increase as the number of users of that technology
increases. If
3d < min
i
bi (8)
holds, all pure strategies 1, 2, and 3 are strict Nash equilibria, and the MBP condition in
(5) is satisfied.
Suppose that the agents’ strategy revision rule is the logit choice rule. Our example is
the exit problem from a convention (see Freidlin and Wentzell (1998)). Specifically, given
the status quo convention of technology 1, what is the least unlikely way to upset this
7
DE
Panel B: Existence of positive feedback (Comparison Principle 1: Propositions 3.1)
 Panel C: Relative strength of positive feedback effects (Comparison Principle 2: Propositions 3.2, 3.3)
E ′
F
F
D
E
1 1
E ′
2 1cost( ) cost( )γ γ<
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
x 2,3x
(2,3)(1,3)x1,3x
x
1,3x1,2x
(1,2)(1,3)x
D
E
E ′
F
1
modify the orders of two agents’ 
swtichings consecutively
2
2 2
a path obtained 
by changing the order 
of two agents’ switchings
x
x ′
x ′′
y
y ′
y ′′
B
D
F
3
2
A
G
4γ B C
D
F
3
2
A
G
4γ
3 2 4 2cost( ) cost( ) or cost( ) cost( )γ γ γ γ< <
numbers of 
diamond shapes
ρ
numbers of 
diamond shapes
η
1ζ
2ζ
3ζ
DC F
D
A
C
D
E
F
1
2
B C
D
F
3
2
1
:A C E
2
:A
3
:
2
 is more likely than 
1
E ′
A
Existence of positive feedback Relative strength of positive feedback
G
Technology 1
A
B C
D
E
F
1
3
2
G
4 : A G Fγ → →
4γ
3 4 2Either or  is more likely than γ γ γ
Technology 1 Technology 1
Panel A: Basin of attraction and the exit problem.
(i) (ii) ( i i i)
DB FA
4γ
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convention? The shaded region in Panel A (i) of Figure 1 shows the basin of attraction of
the technology 1 convention, D(n)(e1). Thus, our problem can be stated succinctly as
min{I(n)(γ) : γ escapes D(n)(e1)}. (9)
We now explain how the MBP in (5) significantly reduces the complexity of solving the
minimization problem in (9).
Comparison principle 1: Propositions 3.1 and 3.4, Part (i)
Our idea is to develop systematic ways of comparing the costs of various paths, and to
reduce the number of candidate solutions for the minimization problem in (9) under the logit
choice rule. Consider the four paths depicted in Panel A-(i) in Figure 1: γ1, γ2, γ3, and γ4.
We first show how the MBP implies that the cost of γ2 is cheaper than that of γ1. Note
that to compare γ1 to γ2, it is enough to compare the path from D through E
′ to E and the
path from D to F in Panel A-(ii) of Figure 1. To compare these two paths, we develop the
first comparison principle as follows. Consider the two paths in Panel B-(i) in Figure 1: (1)
x → x2,3 → x(2,3)(1,3) and (2) x → x1,3 → x(1,3)(2,3), where x(2,3)(1,3) = x(1,3)(2,3). Recall the
notations, xi,j and x(i,j)(k,l), in equation (1). The cost difference between these two paths is
∆1c := c
(n)(x, x2,3) + c(n)(x2,3, x(2,3)(1,3))− [c(n)(x, x1,3) + c(n)(x1,3, x(1,3)(2,3))]. (10)
Note that under the logit choice rule, an agent switching from strategy 2 to strategy 3
compares the expected payoff of strategy 3 with the best response (strategy 1) rather than
with strategy 2, implying that the costs of transitions from strategy 2 to strategy 3 and from
strategy 1 to strategy 3 are the same. Indeed using equation (3) we verify that
c(n)(x, x2,3) = c(n)(x, x1,3), c(n)(x1,3, x(1,3),(2,3)) = c(n)(x1,3, x(1,3),(1,3)) (11)
Thus, using equation (11), we can simplify (10) as follows:
∆1c = c
(n)(x2,3, x(2,3)(1,3))− c(n)(x1,3, x(1,3),(1,3))
Note that x2,3 is the state where exactly one more agent than in x1,3 plays strategy 1, because
x2,3 − x1,3 = 1
n
(e1 − e2). The positive feedback effect of strategy 1 over strategy 3, induced
by the MBP, means that the payoff advantage of strategy 1 over strategy 3 is greater when
the other player uses strategy 1. Thus, the marginal advantage of switching to strategy 1
is greater at state (x2,3) where one more agent than in the other state (x1,3) plays strategy
1. This means that the payoff loss due to the mistake of not playing strategy 1 is greater
at x2,3 than it is at x1,3. Thus, we expect that under the logit dynamic, the transition from
strategy 1 to strategy 3 will be more costly at x2,3 than it will be at x1,3. Indeed, we find
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that
∆1c = c
(n)(x2,3, x(2,3)(1,3))− c(n)(x1,3, x(1,3)(1,3)) = pi(1, x2,3)− pi(3, x2,3)− [pi(1, x1,3)− pi(3, x1,3)]
=
1
n
(A11 −A31 − (A12 − A32)) > 0 (12)
which is positive from the marginal bandwagon property condition (5). Equation (12) also
shows that when agents make the same mistake (switching from 1 to 3), the cost becomes
cheaper (c(n)(x1,3, x(1,3)(1,3)) < c(n)(x2,3, x(2,3)(1,3))). In sum, under the assumption of the
marginal bandwagon property, the cost of path x→ x1,3 → x(1,3)(2,3) is cheaper than that of
x→ x2,3 → x(2,3)(1,3) (see Panel B-(i) of Figure 1 and Proposition 3.1).
Now, consider the new path (shown as a dotted line) obtained by altering a single agent’s
switching in Panel B-(ii) of Figure 1. The cost difference between the original and new paths
in Panel B-(ii) of Figure 1 is precisely the cost difference between the two paths in Panel B-
(i). Thus, if equation (12) is positive, the cost of the new path in Panel B-(ii) is strictly lower
than that of the original path. Then, by successively altering a single agent’s switching, we
can apply the same arguments repeatedly as in Panel B-(iii) and (iv) of Figure 1 (Proposition
3.4, Part (i)). In this way, we find that the cost of path D → F is cheaper than that of path
D → E ′ → E and finally the cost of path γ2 is cheaper than that of path γ1.
Comparison principle 2: Propositions 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4, Part (ii)
Next, we compare the three paths, γ2, γ3, and γ4 in Panel A-(iii) of Figure 1. Similarly,
we first consider the two paths in (i) of Panel C of Figure 1: (1) x → x1,3 → x(1,3)(1,2) and
(2) x→ x1,2 → x(1,2)(1,3), where x(1,3)(1,2) = x(1,2)(1,3):
∆2c :=c
(n)(x, x1,3) + c(n)(x1,3, x(1,3)(1,2))− [c(n)(x, x1,2) + c(n)(x1,2, x(1,2)(1,3))]
= [c(n)(x, x1,3)− c(n)(x1,2, x(1,2)(1,3))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i) positive feedback of 1 over 3
− [c(n)(x, x1,2)− c(n)(x1,3, x(1,3)(1,2))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii) positive feedback of 1 over 2
. (13)
If we let x = y2,3, then x1,2 = y1,3 and, as in equation (12), (i) in equation (13) becomes
c(n)(x, x1,3)− c(n)(x1,2, x(1,2)(1,3)) = c(n)(y2,3, y(2,3)(1,3))− c(n)(y1,3, y(1,3)(1,3))
=
1
n
(A11 − A31 − (A12 − A32)).
Furthermore, if we let x = z3,2, then x1,3 = z1,2 and (ii) in equation (13) becomes
c(n)(x, x1,2)− c(n)(x1,3, x(1,3)(1,2)) = c(n)(z3,2, z(3,2)(1,2))− c(n)(z1,2, z(1,2)(1,2))
=
1
n
(A11 − A21 − (A13 − A23)) ,
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which is the positive feedback effect of strategy 1 over 2. Thus,
∆2c =
1
n
(−A12 + A13 + A21 − A23 − A31 + A32) =
6d
n
. (14)
Here, 6d in equation (14) can be positive, negative, or zero. When 6d = 0, the game is a
potential game, and this is the well-known test for potential games by Hofbauer (1985) and
Monderer and Shapley (1996). Sandholm and Staudigl (2016) also define (14) by “skew”
and use it to compare the costs of paths in the infinite population model.
Next, using this result, we compare the three paths in Panel C (ii) of Figure 1, defined
as follows:
ζ1 : x→ y → y
′ → y′′, ζ2 : x→ x
′ → y′ → y′′, ζ3 : x→ x
′ → x′′ → y′′
Then, applying equation (14), we find that
I(n)(ζ1)− I
(n)(ζ2) =
6d
n
and I(n)(ζ2)− I
(n)(ζ3) =
6d
n
(15)
which shows that
[I(n)(ζ2)− I
(n)(ζ1)] + [I
(n)(ζ2)− I
(n)(ζ3)] = 0. (16)
This, in turn, implies that either
I(n)(ζ2) > I
(n)(ζ1), I
(n)(ζ2) > I
(n)(ζ3) or I
(n)(ζ1) = I
(n)(ζ2) = I
(n)(ζ3) (17)
holds. Thus, from the inequalities in (17), either ζ1 or ζ3 costs less than (or is equal to) ζ2
and we can remove ζ2 from the candidate paths minimizing the problem in equation (9).
Finally, we compare the costs of the three paths, γ2, γ3, and γ4 in Panel A-(iii) of Figure
1. Assume that there are ρ diamond shapes in the area between γ4 and γ2, and η diamond
shapes between γ2 and γ3 (see Panel C (iii) of Figure 1). Now, by applying the comparison
results in equation (15) successively, we find that
I(n)(γ4)− I
(n)(γ2) = ρ
6d
n
, I(n)(γ2)− I
(n)(γ3) = η
6d
n
. (18)
which yields
η[I(n)(γ2)− I
(n)(γ4)] + ρ[I
(n)(γ2)− I
(n)(γ3)] = 0. (19)
This, in turn, implies that either
I(n)(γ2) > I
(n)(γ4), I
(n)(γ2) > I
(n)(γ3) or I
(n)(γ2) = I
(n)(γ4) = I
(n)(γ3) (20)
holds. Using this, we can also remove γ2 from the minimum cost candidate paths (see Panel
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B (iv) of Figure 1).
Finally, we apply these two comparison principles, to obtain a class of paths comprising
the candidate solutions to the cost minimization problem in equation (9). These paths consist
of consecutive transitions first from technology 1 to technology 2 and then from technology
1 to technology 3. Alternatively, there could be consecutive transitions first from technology
1 to technology 3 and then from technology 1 to technology 2. Thus, we can reduce the
complicated objective function in equation (9) to a function of two variables (i.e., number
of transitions from technology 1 to technology 2, and those from technology 1 to technology
3) and easily study the minimization problem of this simple objective function relying on
elementary calculus. In general, we reduce the objective function with an arbitrary number
of variables in equation (9) to an objective function with |S| − 1 variables, where |S| is the
number of strategies of the underlying game. We then prove that the lowest cost transition
path to escape convention 1 involves the repetition of the same kinds of mistakes. That is,
graphically, these paths lie on the edges of the simplex from strategy 1 to strategy 2 and
from strategy 1 to strategy 3.
3. Exit from the basin of attraction of a convention : one population models
We start by proving our comparison principles for games with an arbitrary number of
strategies. With regard to the cost function c(n), an immediate consequence of the MBP
is that, given two paths, x → x(i,k) → x(i,k)(m¯,l) and x → x(m¯,k) → x(i,k)(m¯,l), it always costs
less (or the same) to first switch away from strategy m¯ and then to switch away from the
other strategies, as already explained in Section 2.
Proposition 3.1 (Comparison Principle 1). Suppose that the MBP holds. Consider
two paths γ1 and γ2 (Panel B (i) of Figure 1) in D
(n)(em¯):
γ1 : x→ x
m¯,k → x(m¯,k)(i,l), γ2 : x→ x
i,k → x(i,k)(m¯,l),
where i 6= m¯, k 6= i, m¯, l 6= i, m¯. Then,
I(n)(γ1) ≤ I
(n)(γ2) .
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Proof. Since c(n)(x, xi,k) = pi(m¯, x)− pi(k, x), we obtain
I(n)(γ2)− I
(n)(γ1) = [pi(m¯, x)− pi(k, x) + pi(m¯, x
i,k)− pi(l, xi,k)]
− [pi(m¯, x)− pi(k, x) + pi(m¯, xm¯,k)− pi(l, xm¯,k)]
=
1
n
([−Am¯i + Am¯k + Ali −Alk]− [−Am¯m¯ + Am¯k + Alm¯ − Alk])
=
1
n
(Am¯m¯ − Alm¯ − Am¯i + Ali) > 0
from the MBP.
Extending (14), the size of the two different positive feedback effects (MBP) can be
compared as follows:
[Aii − Aji − Aik + Ajk]− [Aii − Aki −Aij + Akj] = [Aij −Aji] + [Ajk − Akj] + [Aki −Aik]
(21)
The following lemma shows that the difference in costs between two paths in the basin of
attraction of the convention m¯ is precisely the relative strength of the positive feedback
effects identified in equation (21).
Proposition 3.2 (Relative strength of the positive feedback effects). Consider two
paths γ1 and γ2 (Panel C (i) of Figure 1) in D(em¯):
γ1 : x→ x
m¯,i → x(m¯,i)(m¯,j), γ2 : x→ x
m¯,j → x(m¯,j)(m¯,i),
where i 6= j. Then, we have
I(n)(γ2)− I
(n)(γ1) =
1
n
(Aji − Ajm¯ + Am¯j − Am¯i −Aij + Aim¯).
Proof. We have
I(n)(γ2)− I
(n)(γ1) = [pi(m¯, x)− pi(j, x) + pi(m¯, x
m¯,j)− pi(i, xm¯,j)]
− [pi(m¯, x)− pi(i, x) + pi(m¯, xm¯,i)− pi(j, xm¯,i)]
=
1
n
(Aji − Ajm¯ + Am¯j − Am¯i −Aij + Aim¯)
An important consequence of Proposition 3.2 is that the cost difference between two
paths, γ1 and γ2, depends only on the kind of strategies, but not on the state, x. As
explained in the subsection of comparison principle 2 in Section 2, we can collect the same
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kinds of transitions (that is, the transitions from strategy m¯ to the same strategy) using
Proposition 3.2. More precisely, we denote by (m¯, k; η) η-times consecutive transitions from
m¯ to k. Also, let xm¯,k,η be a new state induced by the agents’ η-times consecutive switches
from m¯ to k from an old state, x.
Proposition 3.3 (Comparison Principle 2). Consider the following paths (see Panel C
(iii) of Figure 1):
γ : x −−−−→
(m¯,k;η)
xm¯,k,η −−−→ y · · · z −−−−→
(m¯,k;ρ)
zm¯,k,ρ
γ′ : x −−−−→
(m¯,k;η)
xm¯,k,η −−−−→
(m¯,k;ρ)
x(m¯,k,η)(m¯,k,ρ) −−−→ ym¯,k,ρ · · · zm¯,k,ρ
γ′′ : x −−−−→ yk,m¯,η · · · zk,m¯,η −−−−→
(m¯,k;η)
z −−−−→
(m¯,k;ρ)
zm¯,k,ρ
where · · · denotes the same transitions. Then the following holds:
η[I(n)(γ′)− I(n)(γ)] + ρ[I(n)(γ′′)− I(n)(γ)] = 0.
Thus, either
I(n)(γ′) > I(n)(γ) > I(n)(γ′′), I(n)(γ′′) > I(n)(γ) > I(n)(γ′), or I(n)(γ′′) = I(n)(γ) = I(n)(γ′)
holds.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Next, we present our main result on the exit problem from a convention m¯ for finite
population n. Let G
(n)
m¯ be the set of all paths escaping the basin of attraction of convention
m¯ at some arbitrary time T ; that is,
G
(n)
m¯ := {γ = (x0, · · · , xT ) :x0 = em¯ , xt ∈ D
(n)(em¯) for 0 < t < T − 1
and xT /∈ D
(n)(em) for some T > 0}. (22)
Thus, our exit problem can be written formally as
min{I(n)(γ) : γ ∈ G
(n)
m¯ }. (23)
Using Propositions 3.1 and 3.3, we significantly reduce the number of candidate solutions
to the problem in (23). That is, when determining the optimal path, we can restrict the
solution to the smaller class of all paths consisting of straight lines parallel to the edges of
the simplex. We define the set of all paths for which all transitions are from m¯ to some other
strategy i (i.e., all paths consisting of straight lines, parallel to the edges of the simplex) (see
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Figure 2: Illustration of Proposition 3.4 Panels A, B, and C show the paths in G
(n)
m¯ in equation (22),
J
(n)
m¯ in equation (24), and K
(n)
m¯ in equation (26), respectively. Part (i) of Proposition 3.4 reduces the set of
candidate paths from G
(n)
m¯ (Panel A) to J
(n)
m¯ (Panel B) and Part (ii) of Proposition 3.4 reduces the set of
candidate paths from J
(n)
m¯ (Panel B) to K
(n)
m¯ (Panel C).
Figure 2), as follows:
J
(n)
m¯ : = {γ = (x1, x2, · · · , xT ) ∈ G
(n)
m¯ ; xt+1 = (xt)
m¯,i for some i, for all t ≤ T − 1} (24)
Furthermore, we consider the set of paths in which identical transitions from m¯ occur con-
secutively:
γ : x
from m¯ to i1
−→
t1 times
y
from m¯ to i2
−→
t2 times
z · · ·
from m¯ to iK
−→
tK times
w
for some given (distinct) i1, i2, · · · , iK . That is, γ consists of a series of consecutive transitions
first from m¯ to i1, then from m¯ to i2, ..., and finally from m¯ to iK . More precisely, we write
γ as
γ = (x1, x2, · · · , xT ) =


xt+1 = (xt)
m¯,i1 if 1 ≤ t ≤ t1
xt+1 = (xt)
m¯,i2 if t1 + 1 ≤ t ≤ t1 + t2
...
xt+1 = (xt)
m¯,iK if
∑K−1
l=1 tl + 1 ≤ t ≤
∑K
l=1 tl =: T − 1
(25)
and define
K
(n)
m¯ :={γ : γ = (x1, x2, · · · , xT ) ∈ J
(n)
m¯ , γ is given by (25) (26)
for some t1, t2, · · · , tK , for some distinct i1, i2, · · · , iK}.
From Propositions 3.1 and 3.3, we obtain Proposition 3.4. The main idea of the proof
is illustrated in Section 2.2. There, we explain how to construct a new lower cost path by
modifying a single agent’s transition successively, using the comparison principles and then
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comparing the three paths to eliminate the intermediate path.
Proposition 3.4 (Finite populations). Suppose that Condition A holds. Then, we have
the following characterizations:
(i) Comparison principle I
min
γ∈G
(n)
m¯
I(n)(γ) = min
γ∈J
(n)
m¯
I(n)(γ).
(ii) Comparison principle II
min
γ∈G
(n)
m¯
I(n)(γ) = min
γ∈K
(n)
m¯
I(n)(γ).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Even after eliminating a substantial number of irrelevant paths from the set of candidate
solutions to the problem in (23), function I(n) still remains complicated, with negligible terms
(in the order of n) when the population is large. Thus, we consider an infinite population
limit. This provides an asymptotic characterization of the exit problem when n is large (see
the discussion in Section 3.3 in Binmore et al. (2003); see also Sandholm and Staudigl (2016)
and Hwang and Newton (2016)). We explain this procedure in more detail in Appendix A.2.
Now we are ready to state our main result for one population models.
Theorem 3.1 (Exit problem: one population model). Assume that Condition A holds.
Then, we have
lim
n→∞
1
n
min
γ∈G
m¯(n)
I(n)(γ) = min
j 6=m¯
{
1
2
(Am¯m¯ −Ajm¯)
2
(Am¯m¯ −Ajm¯) + (Ajj − Am¯j)
}
(27)
Proof. See Section A.2 .
In the much-studied uniform mistake model, the probabilities of mistakes are identical for
all states and, hence, are independent of the states (see, e.g, Binmore et al. (2003)). There-
fore, the threshold number of deviant agents who induce other agents to change their best
responses is the only determinant of the expected escape time and stochastic stability. The
number n (Am¯m¯−Aim¯)
(Am¯m¯−Aim¯)+(Aii−Am¯i)
is the threshold number of agents deviating from strategy m¯ to
strategy i and inducing others to best respond with strategy i. Obviously, our arguments for
Theorem 3.1 can be applied to the uniform mistake model as well. In particular, comparison
principe 1 holds as an equality, which can still be used to find a minimum cost path and
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Figure 3: Costs of uniform mistake and logit choice models. Let p be the population fraction using
strategy 1 and the expected payoffs to strategies 1 and 2 be π1(p) and π2(p), respectively. Under the uniform
mistake model, the cost of escaping the equilibrium of strategy 1 is simply the size of the basin of attraction
of strategy 1 equilibrium, a1
a1+a2
. This cost under the logit choice rule is now the area of the shaded region,
1
2 × a1 ×
a1
a1+a2
. This cost thus accounts for the individual opportunity cost of miscoordination (e.g., when
p = 1, this cost is a1 and as p decreases, this cost decreases) as well as the threshold number of agents
inducing others to adopt a different best response.
comparison principle 2 holds without any modification. Thus, when the MBP holds,
lim
n→∞
1
n
min
γ∈G
(n)
m¯
I
(n)
uniform(γ) = min
j 6=m¯
{
(Am¯m¯ −Ajm¯)
(Am¯m¯ −Ajm¯) + (Ajj −Am¯j)
}
(28)
where Iuniform is the cost function under the uniform mistake model (see also Binmore et al.
(2003); Kandori and Rob (1998)).
Comparing (27) and (28) reveals that the logit rule cost also accounts for the opportunity
cost of mistakes (Am¯m¯ − Ajm¯) adopting sub-optimal strategy j instead of the best response
strategy m¯ as well as the threshold fraction of the population inducing a new best response.
Figure 3 illustrates the exit cost of the logit cost rule for the two strategy game. Specifically,
under the logit model, the threshold fraction of agents inducing a new best response is
weighted by individuals’ average cost of mistakes, 1
2
(Am¯m¯ − Ajm¯) (equation (27)). This
(plausible) modification of costs creates a different prediction for the exit path and time, as
well as the stochastically stable state from the uniform model (see Section 4.2).
4. Two population models and the application: the logit solutions for the Nash
demand game
4.1. Two population models
For the application of our results to the Nash demand game, we briefly introduce the
two population setup and state the result for two population models (Theorem 4.1), which
is proved in a similarly way to the one population model result. Consider two populations
denoted by α and β, consisting of the same number of agents n, and suppose that a bimatrix
game (Aα, Aβ), where Aκ is a |S| × |S| matrix for κ = α, β. An α-agent playing i against
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j obtains a payoff Aαij , while a β-agent playing j against i obtains A
β
ij . We introduce the
following definition.
Definition 4.1. We say that (Aα, Aβ) is a coordination game if Aαii > A
α
ji and A
β
ii > A
β
ij for
all i, j. We also say that (Aα, Aβ) satisfies the weak marginal bandwagon property (WBP)
if
Aαm¯m¯ − A
α
im¯ ≥ A
α
m¯j −A
α
ij and A
β
m¯m¯ − A
β
m¯i ≥ A
β
jm¯ −A
β
ji (29)
for all distinct i, j, m¯.
Note that condition (29) is weaker than the MBP which requires strict inequalities. We
relax the MBP, because we would like to study a broader class of games including Nash
demand games (Nash (1953))3. Similarly to Condition A, we make the following assumption:
Condition B: Suppose that game (Aα, Aβ) is a coordination game, satisfies the WBP, and
admits mixed-strategy Nash equilibria supported on arbitrary subsets of pure strategies.
Let x = (xα, xβ) ∈ ∆
(n)
α ×∆
(n)
β , where ∆
(n)
κ := {xκ :
∑
xκ(i) = 1, and xκ(i) ≥ for all i}
for κ = α, β. Then, the expected payoffs are similarly given by
piα(i, x) = piα(i, xβ) =
n∑
j=1
xβ(j)A
α
ij, piβ(j, x) = piβ(i, xα) =
n∑
i=1
xα(i)A
β
ij
We denote by xα,i,j (or xβ,i,j) the state induced by an α-agent’s (or β-agent’s) switching from
i to j from x. We also denote by xα,i,j,η (or xβ,i,j,η) the state induced from x by α-agents’
η-times consecutive switchings (or β-agents η-times consecutive transitions) from i to j. We
write eαi and e
β
j as the i-th and j-th standard basis for R
|S| and thus (eαi , e
β
i ) ∈ ∆
(n)
α ×∆
(n)
β
is a convention. We similarly define a basin of attraction of convention i as follows:
D(n)(em¯) := {x = (xα, xβ) ∈ ∆
(n)
α ×∆
(n)
β : piα(m¯, xβ) ≥ piα(k, xβ), piβ(m¯, xα) ≥ piβ(k, xα) for all k}
and compute the cost functions between states:
c(n)(x, xα,i,j) := piα(m¯,x)− piα(j, x), c
(n)(x, xβ,i,j) := piβ(m¯,x)− piβ(j, x) (30)
for x ∈ D(n)(em¯). We similarly define a cost function of a path, I
(n), as in equation (4) and
the set of all paths escaping the basin of attraction of convention m¯ as G
(n)
m¯ , as in equation
(22).
For two population models, two kinds of deviant behaviors naturally arise depending on
3It is straightforward to check that a discrete Nash demand game satisfies (29)
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the intentionality of deviant plays (Naidu, Hwang, and Bowles, 2010; Hwang, Lim, Neary, and Newton,
2016), namely an unintentional or intentional logit choice rule. The unintentional logit choice
rule refers to the standard logit rule in the context of the two population model, defined as
follows:
Unintentional logit choice rule: p
U,(κ)
β (l|x) :=
exp(βpiκ(l, x))∑
l′ exp(βpiκ(l
′, x)
for κ = α, β. (31)
By the intentional choice rule, we mean that agents choose a non-best-response strategy
from the set of strategies that would give a higher payoff than the payoff at the status quo
convention when adopted as a convention. Thus, the intentional logit choice rule means that
agents play a non-best-response strategy among the set restricted by “intentional” behaviors,
with probabilities specified by the logit choice rule. Experimental evidence for intentional
as well as payoff-dependent behaviors captured by the logit rule is provided in Ma¨s and Nax
(2016), Lim and Neary (2016), and Hwang, Lim, Neary, and Newton (2016).4
More precisely, to define the intentional logit choice rule, we introduce the sets of the
permissible suboptimal strategies under the intentional dynamic:
S˜m(κ) := {l : A
κ
ll ≥ A
κ
mm}, Sˆx(κ) := {l : A
κ
ll ≥ A
κ
mm for m ∈ argmax
i
{piκ(i, x)}} (32)
That is, S˜m(κ) is the set of all strategies which yield payoffs higher than (or equal to) strategy
m if adopted as a convention, while Sˆx(κ) is the set of all strategies which yield payoffs higher
than (or equal to) the current convention at state x if adopted as a convention. We make
the following assumption for conflict in interests between the two populations, α and β:
S˜m(α) ∪ S˜m(β) = S, S˜m(α) ∩ S˜m(β) = m
Thus, except for the current convention strategy m, the set of strategies that α population
prefers is different from the set of strategies that β population prefers. Then under the
intentional logit choice rule, the conditional probability that a κ = α, β agent chooses strategy
4Lim and Neary (2016) find that individual mistakes are directed in the sense that they are group-
dependent. The directed mistakes in their paper are intentional behaviors of deviant agents; for example, they
find that 2.25% of subjects play mistakes when the best response is the preferred strategy, whereas 20.85%
of subjects play mistakes when the best response is the less preferred strategy (Figure 5 (a) on p .19). Also,
Ma¨s and Nax (2016) report that the vast majority of decisions (96%) are myopic best responses, although
deviations are sensitive to their costs. Particularly, they write that “deviation rates were significantly lower
when subjects faced a decision where the MBR (myopic best response) was the subjects preferred option,
which lends support to the assumption that deviations can be directed”(on p. 204).
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l at a given state x is given by
Intentional logit choice rule: p
I,(κ)
β (l|x) :=


exp(βpiκ(l,x))∑
l′∈Sˆκ(x)
exp(βpiκ(l′,x)
if l ∈ Sˆκ(x)
0 if l 6∈ Sˆκ(x).
(33)
To state our result for the two population model, we let ζα (or ζβ) the threshold fractions of β-
population (or α-population) inducing a new best response in α-population (or β-population)
be
ζαm,j :=
(Aαmm −A
α
jm)
(Aαmm −A
α
jm) + (A
α
jj − A
α
mj)
, ζβm,j :=
(Aβmm − A
β
mj)
(Aβmm − A
β
mj) + (A
β
jj − A
β
jm)
.
In Theorem 4.1 below, we show that the minimum cost escaping path from convention
m is similarly given by the threshold fraction weighted by the individual’s opportunity cost
(Aβmm−A
β
mj for β-population agents and A
α
mm−A
α
jm for α-population agents). To state this,
we let
RUmj := (A
β
mm−A
β
mj)ζ
α
mj ∧ (A
α
mm−A
α
jm)ζ
β
mj , R
I
mj :=
{
(Aαmm − A
α
jm)ζ
β
mj, if j ∈ S˜m(α)
(Aβmm − A
β
mj)ζ
α
mj, if j ∈ S˜m(β).
(34)
Note that under the intentional logit choice rule (RImj in (34)), the sets of strategies for which
minimum cost transitions occur are precisely the sets of strategies that the transition driving
population prefers. This is because under the intentional dynamic, the deviant plays always
involve strategies that the deviant population prefers. For the two population models, the
minimum cost escape path from convention m again occurs at the boundary of the simplex
(the state space), as is the case for the one population model:
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that Condition B holds. Then
Unintentional: lim
n→∞
1
n
min
γ∈G
(n)
m¯
I(n)(κ) = min
j 6=m
RUmj
Intentional: lim
n→∞
1
n
min
γ∈G
(n)
m¯
I(n)(κ) = min
j 6=m
RImj
Proof. See Appendix B.
4.2. The logit solutions for the Nash demand game
In this section, we present the application of our results to the Nash demand games
(Nash, 1953), using Theorem 4.1. Consider a bargaining set, S ⊂ R2, consisting of payoffs to
two populations when they agree to split. We normalize the “disagree” point to (0, 0). We
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Unintentional Intentional
Uniform f(s
NB)
sNB
= −f ′(sNB) f(s
NB)
sNB
= −f ′(sNB)
Logit f(s
NB)
sNB
= −f ′(sNB)
(
f(sI )
sI
)2
= −f ′(sI)
Table 1: Bargaining solutions for the Nash demand game. The bargaining solutions for the Nash
demand game under the logit choice rule are new.
describe the bargaining frontier by a function f that is decreasing, differentiable and strictly
concave. That is,
S = {(x, y) : y ≤ f(x)}
where f(x) ≥ 0, f ′(x) < 0, and f ′′(x) < 0 for all x. We let s¯ the maximum payoff to
populations α: i.e., s¯ := max{x : (x, y) ∈ S}. Bargaining solutions dictate how to divide the
surpluses (defined by the bargaining set) between two populations5.
Which is the bargaining norm arising through decentralized evolutionary bargaining pro-
cesses under the logit choice rule? To answer this question, following the standard literature
on evolutionary bargaining (Young, 1993b, 1998a; Binmore et al., 2003; Hwang et al., 2016),
we discretize the bargaining set as follows and consider a Nash demand game. More specifi-
cally, let L be a positive integer and δ := s¯
L
. Define a Nash demand game:
(Aαij, A
β
ij) :=
{
(δi, f(δj)), if i ≤ j
(0, 0), if i > j,
(35)
where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , L − 1} and we will let δ → 0 (or L → ∞) eventually. Then, we can
easily check that the game in (35) satisfies Condition B.
Note that for the game defined in (35), while the α-population prefers strategy m to
strategy m′ (for m > m′), the β-population prefers strategy m′ to strategy m (for m > m′).
This is because at a higher (or lower) index convention, an α-population agent (or a β-
population agent) claims a large share. Thus, under the intentional logic dynamic, an α
population agent idiosyncratically plays a suboptimal strategy from the set of strategies with
higher indices than the current strategy, whereas a β population agent does the opposite.
Next, we find a stochastic stable state using Theorem 4.1 (see Section C.1 and Theorem
C.1). To explain this, first consider the intentional logit choice rule for its simplicity. We
would like to find the minimum cost of transitions from convention m (RImj in 34) and the
5Three axiomatic bargaining solutions are most commonly used: the Nash bargaining solution (Nash,
1950), the Kalai-Smorondinsky bargaining solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975), and the Egalitarian
bargaining solution (Kalai, 1977). See Table 1.
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costs of transition driven by each population are given as follows:
α-pop.: min
j∈S˜m(α)
{(Aαmm − A
α
jm)
(Aβmm − A
β
mj)
(Aβmm − A
β
mj) + (A
β
jj −A
β
jm)
} = min
m<j
mδ
f(δm)− f(δj)
f(δm)
(36)
β-pop.: min
j∈S˜m(β)
{(Aβmm −A
β
mj)
(Aαmm −A
α
jm)
(Aαmm −A
α
jm) + (A
α
jj −A
α
mj)
} = min
m>j
f(mδ)
(m− j)δ
mδ
(37)
for given m. In the second equation in (36), the minimum is taken over {j : m < j} since the
α-population prefers the strategy with a higher index, while the opposite holds true for the
β-population in (37). We then find the minimum cost of transitions, also called the radius
for convention m, as follows:
min
j
RImj = min{f(mδ)
δ
mδ
,mδ
f(δm)− f(δ(m+ 1))
f(δm)
} (38)
It can be shown that a conventionm which maximizes minj Rmj is a stochastically stable state
for the game in (35) under the unintentional or intentional logit choice rule (see Appendix
C.1 and Appendix D). Note that the first term in the minimum of equation (38) is decreasing
in m and the second term in the minimum of equation (38) is increasing in m. Thus, the
maximum of (38) is achieved where the gap between the two terms in the minimum of
equation (38) is smallest. Heuristically, we find that
f(mδ)
δ
mδ
= mδ
f(δm)− f(δ(m+ 1))
f(δm)
⇐⇒
(
f(mδ)
mδ
)2
=
f(δm)− f(δ(m+ 1))
δ
→
(
f(x)
x
)2
= −f ′(x)
if mδ → x and δ → 0
More precisely, we define(
f(sI)
sI
)2
= −f ′(sI) and
f(sNB)
sNB
= −f ′(sNB). (39)
and sNB is the familiar Nash bargaining solution and sI is a new solution under the inten-
tional logit choice rule. We also let sE be the egalitarian solution:
f(sE) = sE .
We then find
(min
j
RImj , argmin
j
RImj) =
{
(mδ f(δm)−f(δ(m+1))
f(δm)
, m+ 1) if δm < sI
(f(mδ)
mδ
δ, m− 1) if δm > sI
(40)
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Let mI ∈ argmaxmminj R
I
mj . Then it is straightforward to show that that m
I is stochas-
tically stable and
δmI → sI as δ → 0
(see Appendix D); thus, the solution sI defined in (39), is the stochastically stable bargaining
norms under the intentional logit dynamic. In addition, the following theorem shows that
the Nash bargaining solution defined in (39) is the stochastically stable bargaining norm
under the unintentional logit rule.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose that f(x) ≥ 0, f ′(x) < 0, and f ′′(x) < 0 for all x. Let m∗(δ) and
mI(δ) be the stochastically stable states under the unintentional and intentional logit models,
respectively. Then we have
m∗(δ)→ sNB and mI(δ)→ sI
as δ → 0.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Figure 4 compares cost minimizing paths under the various mistake models for the Nash
demand game (see also Table 1). Under the unintentional logit choice rule, the Nash bar-
gaining solution arises as a bargaining norm, as in the uniform model (Theorem 4.2 and
see Binmore et al. (2003)). However, the underlying mechanism is dramatically different
from the uniform model as Figure 4 shows. Under the unintentional logit choice rule, un-
like the uniform mistake model, when α population’s share at the Nash bargaining solution
(sNB) is greater than the equal division (sE), transitions from the egalitarian solution to the
Nash bargaining solution are induced by β-population agents even if these transitions are α
-population’s favorite transitions (transitions to a higher index convention). This is because
under the logit dynamic, this opportunity cost of the deviant play (as well as the threshold
fraction) matters and when the α -population claims a larger share than the β-population,
the opportunity cost can make transitions induced by the α-population more costly than
those induced by the β-population. Thus, under the unintentional logit choice model, when
the Nash bargaining solution favors the α-population, transitions from the egalitarian so-
lution are driven by the β-population (see x1, x2, x3, x4 in Figure 4), leading to the Nash
bargaining solution in which the α-population claims a larger share than the β-population.
Under the intentional logit choice rule, transitions always occur by those who stand to
benefit from the transitions. That is, every transition to a higher index convention is driven
by the α-population, while every transition to a lower index convention is driven by the β-
population. Thus, some transitions from the egalitarian solution to a higher index convention
driven by the β-population under the unintentional model are now replaced by transitions
to a lower index convention by the β-population and this pushes the stochastically stable
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-favored transitionα
-favored transitionβ
transition by α
transition by β
transition by α
transition by β
transition by α
transition by β
Is NBs
Es
Uniform
Unintentional Logit
Intentional Logit 
1x 2x 3x 4x 5x
(unintentional or intentional)
Figure 4: Minimal trees. The closed circle, hexagon, and square correspond to the egalitarian solution
(sE), the intentional logit solution (sI), and the Nash bargaining solution (sNB). Each small dot represents
a convention. The regular arrows show transitions induced by the α-population, while the dotted arrows
show transitions induced by the β-population. Under the unintentional logit choice rule, when the α’s share
of Nash bargaining solution sNB is greater than that of the egalitarian solution sE , the transitions from the
egalitarian solution to the Nash bargaining solution are driven by β-population.
state toward a more equal convention (see x4, x5 in Figure 4). In this way, intentionality
equalizes the division of the surplus.
Proposition 4.1. The logit intentional bargaining solution is more equal than the logit un-
intentional bargaining solution: i.e., either
sNB > sI > sE or sE > sI > sNB
holds.
Proof. See Lemma D.5.
Hwang et al. (2016) also find that for the contract game (the coordination game in which
all off-diagonal payoffs are zeroes), intentionality makes the stochastically stable division of
surpluses between the two populations more equal under the logit choice rule. However,
the mechanism under which equality is achieved is again different. Under the contract
game, the intentionality equalizes the threshold fractions of one population inducing a new
best response for the other population (at 1/2), and equality is achieved. For the Nash
demand game, intentionality replaces unfavorable transitions for the deviant population by
the favorable transitions and a more equal convention arises.
5. Summary
Relying on positive feedback conditions and the relative strengths of these effects we
24
developed methods to identify the most likely paths for evolutionary population dynamics
under the logit rule. We identified two main factors determining the minimum cost path
escaping from a convention: (1) the existence of positive feedback effects, and (2) the relative
strengths of positive feedback effects. This leads us to simple but powerful comparison
principles that drastically reduce the number of candidate paths for minimizing the escaping
cost from a convention. To summarize, we showed that the path with minimal cost involves
only the repeated identical mistakes of the agents. We also applied our finding to the
bargaining problem to find the stochastically stable states and obtain a new bargaining
norm.
As another extension, consider a better reply rule. The cost of the exponential better
reply updating rule cbetter(x, xi,j) in the literature is given as follows (Sandholm, 2010):
cbetter(x, xi,j) = [pi(i, x)− pi(j, x)]+ (41)
where [t]+ = t if t > 0 and [t]+ = 0 otherwise. The idea behind equation (41) is that the
cost of playing j is now compared to the payoff of the current strategy i, instead of to the
best-response strategy m¯. This models the behavior of an agent adopting a new strategy j
when it gives a higher payoff than the current strategy i (consistent with the better-reply
rule) and the cost of such behavior is zero. Note that if the current strategy i is the same as
the best-response strategy m¯, the cost of the better-reply rule in equation (41) is the same
as that of the logit choice rule (3). In particular, along paths γ, γ′, and γ′′ in Proposition
3.3, the cost of the better-reply rule is the same as that of the logit choice rule. Therefore
Proposition 3.3 and Proposition 3.4 (ii) still hold for the better-reply rule in equation (41).
Thus, if we show that the minimum cost escape paths under the better-reply rule involve
only transitions from m¯, Proposition 3.3 and Proposition 3.4 (ii) can be used to estimate the
minimum escape cost.
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A. Exit problem: one population models
A.1. Finite populations: proofs of Proposition 3.3 and 3.4
We denote by c(a, ai,j,ρ) be the cost of a path from a to ai,j,ρ in which agents switch from i to j, ρ-times
consecutively and let π(k, x − y) := π(k, x) − π(k, y) and γa→b be a path from a to b. We first need the
following lemma.
Lemma A.1. We have the following results.
(i) c(a, am¯,k,ρ)− c(b, bm¯,k,ρ) = ρ[(π(m¯, a)− π(k, a)) − (π(m¯, b)− π(k, b))]
(ii) η[c(a, am¯,k,ρ)− c(b, bm¯,k,ρ)] + ρ[c(bk,m¯,η, b)− c(ak,m¯,η, a)] = 0
(iii) η[I(γam¯,k,ρ→bm¯,k,ρ)− I(γa→b)] + ρ[I(γak,m¯,η→bk,m¯,η )− I(γa→b)] = 0
where γak,m¯,η→bk,m¯,η , γak,m¯,η→bk,m¯,η , and γa→b consist of the same transitions.
Proof. For (i), we have
c(a, am¯,k,ρ) = π(m¯, x)− π(k, x) + π(m¯, xm¯,k)− π(k, xm¯,k) + · · ·+ π(m¯, xm¯,k,ρ−1)− π(k, xm¯,k,ρ−1)
= ρ(π(m¯, x)− π(k, x)) +
ρ(ρ− 1)
2
1
n
(−Am¯m¯ +Am¯k +Akm¯ −Akk).
For (ii), first using (i) (by setting bk,m¯,η = a), we first find that
c(bk,m¯,η, b)− c(ak,m¯,η, a) = η[(π(m¯, bk,m¯,η)− π(k, bk,m¯,η)− (π(m¯, ak,m¯,η)− π(k, ak,m¯,η))].
Then we have
η[c(a, am¯,k,ρ)− c(b, bm¯,k,ρ)] + ρ[c(bk,m¯,η, b)− c(ak,m¯,η, a)]
=ηρ[(π(m¯, a)− π(k, a))− (π(m¯, b)− π(k, b))] + ηρ[(π(m¯, bk,m¯,η)− π(k, bk,m¯,η)− (π(m¯, ak,m¯,η)− π(k, ak,m¯,η))] = 0
For (iii), suppose that (a, b) = (a1, a2, · · · , aT ) where aT = b. Then at+1 = (at)
it,lt for some it, lt. First we
find
η[c(at
m¯,k,ρ, (at
m¯,k,ρ)it,lt)− c(at, at
it,lt)] + ρ[c(at
k,m¯,η, (at
k,m¯,η)it,lt)− c(at, at
it,lt)]
=η[π(m¯, at
m¯,k,ρ − at)− π(lt, at
m¯,k,ρ − at)] + ρ[π(m¯, at
k,m¯,η − at)− π(lt, at
k,m¯,η − at)]
=
1
n
η[ρ(−Am¯m¯ +Am¯k)− ρ(−Altm¯ +Altk)] + ρ[η(−Am¯k +Am¯m¯)− η(−Altk +Altm¯)] = 0
We thus find that
η[c(am¯,k,ρ, bm¯,k,ρ)− c(a, b)] + ρ[c(ak,m¯,η, bk,m¯,η)− c(a, b)]
=
T−1∑
t=1
η[c(at
m¯,k,ρ, (at
m¯,k,ρ)m¯,lt)− c(at, at
m¯,lt)] + ρ[c(at
k,m¯,η, (at
k,m¯,η)m¯,lt)− c(at, at
m¯,lt)] = 0
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Proof of Proposition 3.3. We find that
η[I(γ′)− I(γ)] + ρ[I(γ′′)− I(γ)]
= η[c(xm¯,k,η, x(m¯,k,η)(m¯,k,ρ))− c(z, zm¯,k,ρ)] + ρ[c(zk,m¯,η, z)− c(x, xm¯,k,η)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i)
+ η[c(x(m¯,k,η)(m¯,k,ρ), ym¯,k,ρ)− c(xm¯,k,η, y)] + ρ[c(x, yk,m¯,η)− c(xm¯,k,η, y)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii)
+ η[I(γym¯k,ρ→zm¯,k,ρ)− I(γy→z)] + ρ[I(γyk,m¯,η→zk,m¯,η)− I(γy→z)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(iii)
Then for (i), if we let a = xm¯,k,η and b = z in Lemma A.1 (ii), we have (i)= 0. For (ii), if we let a = x(m¯,k,η)
and b = y in Lemma A.1 (ii), we have (ii)= 0. For (iii), if we let a = y and b = z in Lemma A.1 (iii), we
have (iii)= 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Part (i). In the proof, we suppress the superscript (n). Let γ = (x1, x2, · · · , xT )
be a path in Gm¯ \ Jm¯. We recursively construct a new path γ˜ ∈ Jm¯ with a cost lower than or equal to the
cost of γ.
For this, let t be the greatest number such that xt+1 = (xt)
i,l with i 6= m¯, l. We distinguish several
cases. If t = T − 1, we consider a new path γ˜ obtained by modifying the last transition as follows:
γ˜ := (x1, x2, · · · , xT−1, (xT−1)
m¯,l).
Then, we have I(γ˜) = I(γ), and show that the path still exitsD(em¯). To prove this, we only need to show that
if z /∈ D(em¯) then z
m¯,i /∈ D(em¯), because this implies that if (xT−1)
i,l /∈ D(em¯), then (xT−1)
m¯,l /∈ D(em¯).
Now, suppose that z /∈ D(em¯) and that there exists k such that π(m¯, z) < π(k, z). Then, we have
[π(k, zm¯,i)− π(m¯, zm¯,i)]− [π(k, z)− π(m¯, z)] =
1
n
(Aki −Akm¯ −Am¯,i +Am¯,m¯) ≥ 0
by Condition A. Thus, we have [π(k, zm¯,i)− π(m¯, zm¯,i)] ≥ [π(k, z)− π(m¯, z)] > 0 and so zm¯,i /∈ D(em¯).
Now, suppose that t < T − 1. Then we have xt+1 = (xt)
i,l and xt+2 = (xt)
(i,l)(m¯,k) for k 6= m¯. Note
that k 6= m¯ and l 6= i. Now we need to distinguish four cases.
Case 1: If k = i, l = m¯, then xt+1 = (xt)
i,m¯, xt+2 = xt. Thus, we consider γ˜ = (x1, · · · , xt, xt+2, · · · , xT );
clearly, I(γ˜) ≤ I(γ), since c(xt, xt+1) = 0, c(xt+1, xt+2) ≥ 0, and c(xt, xt+2) = 0.
Case 2: If k = i, l 6= m¯ then xt+2 = (xt)
(i,l)(m¯,k) = (xt)
m¯,l. Again, we consider the path γ˜ = (x1, · · · , xt, xt+2, · · · , xT )
and find that I(γ˜) ≤ I(γ) because we have c(xt, xt+1) = c(xt, xt+2) = π(m,xt)−π(l, xt) and c(xt+1, xt+2) ≥
0.
Case 3: If k 6= i, l = m¯, then xt+2 = x
(i,m¯)(m¯,k)
t = (xt)
i,k. Again, let γ˜ = (x1, · · · , xt, xt+2, · · · , xT ). Then
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we have c(xt, xt+1) = 0 and
c(xt+1, xt+2)− c(xt, xt+2) = c(x
i,l
t , x
(i,l)(m¯,k)
t )− c(xt, x
(i,k)
t )
= π(m¯, xi,m¯t )− π(k, x
i,m¯
t )− [π(m¯, xt)− π(k, xt)]
=
1
n
(Am¯m¯ −Akm¯ − [Am¯i −Aki]) ≥ 0
from the MBP, implying that I(γ˜) ≤ I(γ).
Case 4: If k 6= i, m¯ and l 6= i, m¯, then we can apply Proposition 3.1. We modify the path by considering the
alternative transitions, x˜t+1 = (xt)
m¯,l and x˜t+2 = (xt)
(m¯,l)(i,k). If (xt)
m¯,l /∈ D(em¯), then we define
γ˜ := (x1, x2, · · · , xt, (xt)
m¯,l)
and because c(xt, (xt)
m¯,l) = c(xt, (xt)
i,l) and c(xt+1, xt+2) ≥ 0, we obtain I(γ˜) ≤ I(γ). If (xt)
m¯,l ∈ D(em¯),
then we define
γ˜ := (x1, x2, · · · , xt, (xt)
m¯,l, (xt)
(m¯,l)(i,k), · · · , xT ).
to find that I(γ˜) ≤ I(γ) from Proposition 3.1. Proceeding inductively we construct a path γ˜ ∈ Jm¯ with a
cost lower than or equal to the cost of γ.
Part (ii). This is the direct consequence of Proposition 3.3. Suppose that γ ∈ Km¯. Then, by applying
Proposition 3.3 repeatedly, we collect the same transitions and find γ˜ ∈ Km¯ such that I(γ˜) ≤ I(γ). Thus we
obtain the desired result.
A.2. Theorem 3.1
We now explain and provide the remaining steps proving Theorem 3.1. We will show that the MBP
is also the key condition for comparing two paths in the infinite population model. To study the infinite
population problem, we need to first find the continuous version of c(x, xi,j) in (3). For this, we denote
by D¯(ei) and ∂D¯i,jthe continuous versions of D
(n)(ei) and ∂D
(n)
i,j , respectively(see Appendix A). We find
that the following definition of a cost function on D¯(ei) is precisely the limit of the discrete cost function at
n =∞ (see Lemma A.2 in Appendix A).
Definition A.1 (Cost of a straight line path). Suppose that p, q ∈ ∆ with q = p+ α(ei − ej) for some
α > 0. If p, q ∈ D¯(em¯), we define
c¯(p, q) :=
1
2
(pj − qj)(π(m¯, p+ q)− π(i, p+ q)). (A.1)
Note that we sometimes denote the cost of a continuum path ζ as I¯(ζ). Then, we define a continuum analogue
of the set of paths K
(n)
m¯ (equation (26)) in the limit of n→∞, and define an associated cost function.
Definition A.2 (The set of admissible straight line paths Km¯ and the related cost function). Set
Km¯ consists of the set of paths given by the collection of piecewise straight lines through the points. More
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Figure A.5: Proofs of Propositions A.2 and A.3. Panel A illustrates Proposition A.2 and Panel B
illustrates Proposition A.3. Panel A illustrates two paths—one involving p and p′, and the other involving p
and q. Proposition A.2 shows that the path through p to p′ has a lower cost than the path through p to q.
Panel B shows that if t∗1 > 0, t
∗
2 > 0, π(1, q(t
∗)) > π(2, q(t∗)), and π(1, q(t∗)) = π(3, q(t∗)), then either the
path t+ǫ or the path t
−
ǫ can be lower than or equal to the cost of the path (t
∗
1, t
∗
2).
precisely, for t = ((t1, · · · , tK); (i1, · · · , iK)) where tl ∈ [0, 1] for all l,
p(0) = em¯, p
(1) = em¯ + t1(ei1 − em¯), · · · , p
(K) = em¯ +
K∑
l=1
tl(eil − em¯), (A.2)
where p(l) ∈ D¯(em¯) for all l and p
(K) ∈ ∂D¯(em¯) := ∪l 6=m¯∂D¯m¯,j. We also set
q(t) := p(K), ζ(t) := (p(0), p(1), · · · , p(K)), and ω(t) := I¯(ζ(t)) =
K−1∑
t=0
c¯(p(t), p(t+1)) (A.3)

Note that path ζ = ζ(t) ∈ Km¯ is uniquely determined by the vector t = ((t1, · · · , tK); (i1, · · · , iK)). We then
have the following approximation result.
Proposition A.1 (Approximation).
lim
n→∞
1
n
min{I(n)(γ) : γ ∈ K
(n)
m¯ } = min {ω(t) : ζ(t) ∈ Km¯} .
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
For the minimization problem min {ω(t) : ζ(t) ∈ Km¯} in Proposition A.1, we explain how to further
reduce the number of candidate solutions (see Panel A Figure A.5). Consider a three-strategy game with
the path t∗ = ((t∗1, t
∗
2); (2, 3)) passing through points p and q = q(t
∗) in Panel A of Figure A.5, where
π(1, q(t∗)) = π(2, q(t∗)) = π(3, q(t∗)). Furthermore, consider an alternative path exiting directly along the
edge between strategies 1 and 2 at p′. To compare the costs of these two paths, using Definition A.1, we
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find that
c¯(p, q) =
1
2
t∗2(π(1, p+ q)− π(3, p+ q)) , c¯(p, p
′) =
1
2
(p′2 − p2)(π(1, p+ p
′)− π(2, p+ p′)).
Thus, from t∗2 > p
′
2 − p2 (see Panel A of Figure A.5) and the fact that q and p
′ are mixed-strategy Nash
equilibria,
c¯(p, q)− c¯(p, p′) ≥
1
2
t∗2[π(1, p)− π(3, p)− (π(1, p)− π(2, p))] =
1
2
t∗2(π(2, p)− π(3, p)).
Clearly, π(2, p) > π(3, p) from Panel A of Figure A.5, because p is located to the left of the line π(2, r) =
π(3, r). Indeed, we can confirm that
π(2, p)− π(3, p) = π(2, q + t∗2(e1 − e3))− π(3, q + t
∗
2(e1 − e3))
= t∗2(A21 −A23 −A31 +A33) > 0
using the MBP, where we again use the fact that q is the complete mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Thus,
we find that c¯(p, q) ≥ c¯(p, p′). Once again, the underlying principle is that the MBP implies that a path
with the same consecutive transitions is cheaper than those with different transitions.
Recall that at the end point q of the escape path, the following constraints must be satisfied:
π(m¯, q) ≥ π(i, q) for all i with at least one constraint binding (A.4)
The above illustration shows that at the end point of the minimal escape path only one constraint is binding
(i.e., π(1, q) = π(2, q)). The following proposition generaslizes the above argument.
Proposition A.2. There exist t∗ such that ω(t∗) = min{ω(t) : ζ(t) ∈ Km¯} and for some k,
π(m¯, q(t∗)) = π(ik, q(t
∗)) and π(m¯, q(t∗)) > π(il, q(t
∗)) for all l 6= k. (A.5)
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
From Proposition A.2, only one binding constraint exists in (A.4). Proposition A.3 further shows that
only one kind of transition to a specific strategy occurs in the minimal escape path. To explain the main
argument for the proof, consider again the three-strategy game in Panel B of Figure A.5. Suppose that
the optimal solution is t∗ = ((t∗1, t
∗
2); (2, 3)) and that t
∗
1, t
∗
2 > 0, π(1, q(t
∗)) > π(2, q(t∗)) and π(1, q(t∗)) =
π(3, q(t∗)) (see the dotted line in Panel B of Figure A.5). Then, from the linearity of the payoff functions,
we have that t+ǫ := (t
∗
1 + ǫ1, t
∗
2 − ǫ2) and t
−
ǫ := (t
∗
1 − ǫ1, t
∗
2 + ǫ2) which still satisfy the constraint of escaping
from the basin of attraction. Then, by direct computation, we have
(ω(t+ǫ )− ω(t)) + (ω(t
−
ǫ )− ω(t)) = −H1,2;2ǫ
2
1 + 2H1,3;2ǫ1ǫ2 −H1,3;3ǫ
2
2 ≤ −(
√
H1,2;2ǫ1 −
√
H1,3;3ǫ2)
2 < 0
where Hi,j;k := (Aii − Aji) − (Aik − Ajk) Thus, either ω(t
+
ǫ ) < ω(t) or ω(t
−
ǫ ) < ω(t) holds. Again, this
shows that the MBP plays an important role in determining the minimum cost escape path under the
infinite population model. The proof of Proposition A.3 generalizes these arguments for an arbitrary n
strategy game.
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Proposition A.3. Let t∗ be the solution to the minimization problem:
min{ω(t) : ζ(t) ∈ Km¯}.
Then there exists k such that t∗k > 0 and t
∗
l = 0 for all l 6= k.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
The ideas behind the proofs of Propositions A.2 and A.3 are simple. However, technical complications
arise for games with arbitrary numbers of strategies and, thus, involve somewhat lengthy computations and
estimations (see Appendix A.2). We now have all the elements in hand, and Theorem 3.1 follows immediately
from Propositions A.1 and A.3.
A.3. Proofs of Proposition A.1, Proposition A.2, and Proposition A.3
Recall that
D(n)(em¯) : = {x ∈ ∆
(n) : π(m¯, x) ≥ π(l, x) for all l}
and let
D¯(em¯) := {p ∈ ∆ : π(m¯, p) ≥ π(l, p) for all l}
and ∂D¯(em¯) be the boundary of D¯(em¯). The following lemma serves to find the continuous version of the
cost function, c(x, xi,j).
Suppose that p, q ∈ ∆ with q = p+ α(ei − ej) for some α > 0. If p, q ∈ D¯(em¯), we define
c¯(p, q) :=
1
2
(pj − qj)(π(m¯, p+ q)− π(i, p+ q)). (A.6)
Lemma A.2. Let γ = γx→y be a straight-line path between x
(n) and y(n) in D(em¯) ⊂ ∆
(n) with y(n) =
x(n) + M
(n)
n
(ei − ej). Suppose that x
(n) → p and y(n) → q for p, q ∈ ∆ as n→∞. Then,
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(n)(γx→y) =
1
2
(pj − qj)(π (m¯, p+ q)− π (i, p+ q))
Proof. Since the path lies in D(em¯) we have
I(n)(γx→y) =
M(n)−1∑
ι=0
[
π
(
m¯, x(n) +
ι
n
(ei − ej)
)
− π
(
i, x(n) +
ι
n
(ei − ej)
)]
. (A.7)
Now using that 1 + 2 + · · ·+K − 1 = (K − 1)K/2, we obtain
M(n)−1∑
t=0
(x(n) +
ι
n
(ei − ej)) = M
(n)x(n) +
M (n)(M (n) − 1)
2
1
n
(ei− ej) = M
(n)x
(n) + y(n)
2
−
M (n)
2
1
n
(ei − ej) .
(A.8)
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By combining equations (A.7) and (A.8) and noting that M
(n)
n
→ pj − qj as n → ∞, we obtain the desired
result.
We then have the following approximation lemma.
Lemma A.3. Suppose that X(n) ⊂ X and f : X → R is a continuous function that admits a minimum and
f (n) : X → R. Suppose also that for all x ∈ X, there exists {x(n)} such that x(n) ∈ X(n), x(n) → x, and
f (n)(x(n))→ f(x). Then, we have
min
x∈X(n)
f (n)(x)→ min
x∈X
f(x)
Proof. Let {x(n)}n be the sequence of minimizers of minx∈X(n) f
(n)(x) and x∗ be the minimizer of minx∈X f(x).
Suppose that f (n)(x(n)) does not converge to f(x∗). Then there exist ǫ0 > 0 and {nk} such that
f (nk)(x(nk)) ≥ f(x∗) + ǫ0. (A.9)
Further, from the hypothesis, we choose y(n) such y(n) → x∗. Since {x(n)} is the sequence of minimizers, we
have
f (n
k)(y(n
k)) ≥ f (n
k)(x(n
k)) (A.10)
Now, by taking k → ∞ in equations (A.9) and (A.10), we find that f(x∗) ≥ f(x∗) + ǫ0, which is a contra-
diction.
Proof of Proposition A.1. We let X(n) := K
(n)
m¯ and X = Km¯ and f
(n) = 1
n
I(n) and f = I¯. Then
Lemmas A.2 and A.3 show that
lim
n→∞
1
n
min{I(n)(γ) : γ ∈ K
(n)
m¯ } = min{I¯(ζ) : ζ ∈ Km¯} = min{ω(t) : ζ(t) ∈ Km¯}
Next, we will prove Proposition A.2 and Proposition A.3. We introduce the following notation:
π(i − j, p− q) := π(i, p)− π(j, p)− π(i, q) + π(j, q)
Then, the MBP implies
π(i − j, ei − ek) = Aii −Aik −Aji +Ajk > 0 (A.11)
and the coordination game implies that
π(i − j, ei − ej) = Aii −Aij −Aji +Ajj > 0 (A.12)
We have the following lemma.
Lemma A.4. Let r ∈ D¯(em¯) and q ∈ ∂D¯(em¯) and q = r + tL(el − em¯). Suppose that
π(m¯, q) = π(k1, q) and π(m¯, q) = π(k2, q).
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Figure A.6: Panel A shows step 1 in Lemma A.4, Panel B shows step 2 in Lemma A.4, and Panel C shows
Lemma A.5
Then there exists p ∈ ∂D(em¯) such that j 6= l, m¯ and p = r + β(ej − em¯), where 0 < β < tL,
π(m¯, p) = π(j, p) and c(r, p) < c(r, q).
Proof. From the condition, tL is the length of transition from m¯ to l, leading to q. Choose k := ki 6= l such
that
π(m¯, q) = π(k, q).
Let
r := q + tL(em¯ − el) and o := r + tL(ek − em¯)
(i.e, r is the point obtained from q by tL transitions from l to m¯; o can be similarly understood). Since
π(k − m¯, r + tL(ek − em¯)) = π(k − m¯, q + tL(em¯ − el) + tL(ek − em¯))
=tLπ(k − m¯, ek − el) > 0
hold from (A.11), we have
π(m¯, r) ≥ π(k, r) and π(m¯, o) < π(k, o)
and from the linearity of the payoff, there exists p such that p = r + α(ek − em¯), where α > 0 and
π(m¯, p) = π(k, p). Then o = p+ (tL − α)(ek − em¯). Thus
0 < π(k, o)− π(m¯, o) = π(k − m¯, p+ (tL − α)(ek − em¯))
≤ (tL − α)π(k − m¯, ek − em¯)
Thus from (A.12) we find tL > α which implies that pk − rk < ql − rl. We divide cases.
Step 1. Suppose that p ∈ D¯(em¯). We also find
c(r, q)− c(r, p) =
1
2
tLπ(m¯− l, r + q)−
1
2
(pk − rk)π(m¯− k, r + p)
≥
1
2
tL(π(m¯− l, r + q)− π(m¯− k, r + p)) =
1
2
tL(π(k, r) − π(l, r))
=
1
2
tLπ(k − l, q + tL(em¯ − el)) =
1
2
tLπ(m¯− l, q) +
1
2
t2Lπ(k − l, em¯ − el) > 0
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where we used π(m¯ − l, q) ≥ 0, π(k, q) = π(m¯, q), and (A.11). Thus we take β := α and j := k and obtain
the desired result.
Step 2. Suppose that p 6∈ D¯(em¯). We use Lemma A.5, presented below. By taking w = p and using Lemma
A.5, we find z. If z ∈ D¯(em¯), then we set p
′ = z. Otherwise, we apply the same argument using Lemma A.5
and to find z closer to r. In this way, we can find j1, j2, · · · . Note that no two indices, j1, j2, are the same
since if j = j1 = j2 then π(m¯−j, r+β1(ej−em¯)) = π(m¯−j1, r+β1(ej1−em¯)) = π(m¯−j2, r+β2(ej2−em¯) =
π(m¯ − j, r + β2(ej − em¯). Thus we find β1 = β2 which is a contradiction. Since the number of strategies is
finite, we can find z ∈ D¯(em¯). Next, we show that j 6= l. If j = l, π(m¯, z) = π(l, z). Thus, we find that
0 ≤π(m¯− l, r + tL(el − em¯))− π(m¯− l, r + β(el − em¯))
=π(m¯− l, (tL − β)(el − em¯)) = (tL − β)(−Am¯m¯ +Am¯l +Alm¯ −All)
and thus we find tL ≤ β which is a contradiction. So we have j 6= l. Then observe that p
′
j − rj < β < tL.
Then, we compute as follows:
c(r, q)− c(r, p′) =
1
2
tLπ(m¯− l, r + q)−
1
2
(p′j − rj)π(m¯− j, r + p
′)
≥
1
2
tL(π(m¯− l, r + q)− π(m¯− j, r + p
′)) =
1
2
tL(π(j, r) − π(l, r))
>
1
2
tL(π(k, r) − π(l, r)) > 0
Thus, we can take p = p′.
Lemma A.5. Let r ∈ D¯(em¯). Suppose that
w = r + α(ek − em¯), π(m¯, w) = π(k, w), and w 6∈ D¯(em¯).
Then there exists j 6= k, m¯ and β < α such that
z := r + β(ej − em¯), π(m¯, z) = π(j, z), and π(j, r) > π(k, r)
Proof. Since w 6∈ D¯(em¯), there exists j 6= k, m¯ such that π(j, w) > π(m¯, w). Since π(m¯, r) ≥ π(j, r), there
exists 0 < α′ < α such that ν = r + α′(ek − em¯) and
π(m¯, ν) = π(j, ν).
Let o′ = r + α(ej − em¯). Note that o
′ = ν − α′(ek − em¯) + α(ej − em¯). Then
π(j − m¯, o′) = π(j − m¯,−α′(ek − em¯) + α(ej − em¯))
= −α′π(m¯− j, em¯ − ek) + απ(m¯ − j, em¯ − ej)
> α(π(j − m¯, ej − em¯)− π(m¯− j, em¯ − ek))
> 0
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Thus since π(m¯, r) ≥ π(j, r), there exists z = r + β(ej − em¯) such that π(m¯, z) = π(j, z) and β < α.
Next, we show that π(j, r) > π(k, r). Suppose that π(k, r) ≥ π(j, r). We let u(s) := r + s(ek − em¯).
Then, we have
π(m¯− j, u(0)) ≥ π(m¯− k, u(0)) (A.13)
d
ds
(π(m¯− k, u(s))) = −Am¯m¯ +Am¯k +Akm¯ −Akk < 0 (A.14)
d
ds
(π(m¯− j, u(s))) = +Am¯k −Am¯m¯ −Ajk +Ajm¯ < 0 (A.15)
d
ds
(π(m¯− k, u(s))) <
d
ds
(π(m¯− j, u(s))) (A.16)
Then, equations (A.13), (A.14), (A.15), and (A.16) imply that
0 = π(m¯− k, w) = π(m¯− k, u(α)) < π(m¯− j, u(α)) = π(m¯− j, r + α(ek − em¯)),
which is a contradiction to the fact that π(m¯− j, r + α′(ek − em¯)) = 0 for α
′ < α. Thus, we have π(j, r) >
π(k, r).
Proof of Proposition A.2. Let t∗ = ((t1, t2, · · · , tL); (i1, i2, · · · , iL)) be the solution to the minimization
problem and (m¯→ i1, m¯→ i2, · · · , m¯→ iL) be the corresponding transitions. Suppose that (A.5) does not
hold. Then there exists k and l where k < l such that
π(m¯, q(t∗)) = π(ik, q(t
∗)) and π(m¯, q(t∗)) = π(il, q(t
∗))
We apply Lemma A.4 and can obtain a lower cost exit path, s∗, by removing tL, consisting of (m¯→ i1, m¯→
i2, · · · , m¯→ iL−1). Thus, ω(s
∗) < ω(t∗), which is a contradiction to optimality of t∗.
Proof of Proposition A.3. Let t be the solution. Then from Proposition A.3, there exists k such that
π(m¯, q(t)) = π(ik, q(t)) and π(m¯, q(t)) > π(il, q(t)) for all l 6= k.
To simplify, we abuse notation by writing k = ik and l = il. Suppose that there exists l such that t
∗
l > 0 for
some l 6= k. Let
t = ((t∗1, · · · , t
∗
k, · · · , t
∗
l , · · · , t
∗
L); (i1, · · · , k, · · · , l, · · · , iL))
t+ǫ = ((t
∗
1, · · · , t
∗
k + ǫk, · · · , t
∗
l − ǫk, · · · , t
∗
L); (i1, · · · , k, · · · , l, · · · , iL))
t−ǫ = ((t
∗
1, · · · , t
∗
k − ǫk, · · · , t
∗
l + ǫk, · · · , t
∗
L); (i1, · · · , k, · · · , l, · · · , iL))
where · · · denotes the same transitions. Then, we have
π(m¯, q(t+ǫ ))− π(ik, q(t
+
ǫ )) =π(m¯, ǫkek − ǫlel)− π(ik, ǫkek − ǫlel)
=ǫk(Am¯k −Akk)− ǫl(Am¯l −Akl)
and similarly we have π(m¯, q(t−ǫ )) − π(il, q(t
−
ǫ )) = −ǫk(Am¯k − Akk) + ǫl(Am¯l − Akl). Thus, we can choose
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small ǫk and ǫl such that
π(m¯, q(t+ǫ )) = π(ik, q(t
+
ǫ )), and π(m¯, q(t
+
ǫ )) > π(il, q(t
+
ǫ )) for all l 6= k
π(m¯, q(t−ǫ )) = π(ik, q(t
−
ǫ )), and π(m¯, q(t
−
ǫ )) > π(il, q(t
−
ǫ )) for all l 6= k,
which show that t+ǫ and t
−
ǫ both satisfy the constraints. We also find that
(ω(t+ǫ )− ω(t))− (ω(t)− ω(t
−
ǫ )) = −H
(m¯)
kk ǫ
2
k + 2H
(m¯)
lk ǫkǫl −H
(m¯)
ll ǫ
2
l
≤ −H
(m¯)
kk ǫ
2
k + 2
√
H
(m¯)
kk
√
H
(m¯)
ll ǫkǫl −H
(m¯)
ll ǫ
2
l ≤ −(
√
H
(m¯)
kk ǫk −
√
H
(m¯)
ll ǫl)
2 < 0
This shows that either ω(t+ǫ ) < ω(t) or ω(t) > ω(t
−
ǫ ) holds, a contradiction to the optimality of t.
B. Exit problem: two-population models
The following lemma is analogous to Proposition 3.1, which shows that it always costs less (or the same)
to first switch from strategy m¯, than from other strategies.
Lemma B.1. Suppose that the WBP holds.
c(n)(xβ,m¯,k, x(β,m¯,k)(α,j,h))− c(n)(xβ,i,k, x(β,i,k)(α,j,h)) = −Aαm¯m¯ +A
α
hm¯ +A
α
m¯i −A
α
hi ≤ 0
c(n)(xα,m¯,k, x(α,m¯,k)(β,j,h))− c(n)(xα,i,k, x(α,i,k)(β,j,h)) = −Aβm¯m¯ +A
β
m¯h +A
β
im¯ −A
β
ih ≤ 0.
Proof. These are immediate from the definition.
Proposition B.1 shows that Lemma B.1 can be extended to arbitrary paths. We use Proposition B.1 to
show how to remove the transitions from i 6= m¯ in a given path to achieve a lower cost. In Proposition B.1,
(β, i, k), for example, refers to a transition by a β-agent from strategy i to k.
Proposition B.1. Suppose that the WBP holds. We consider two paths:
γ1 :x −−−−→
(β,i,k)
x(1) −−−−−−→
(α,j1,k1)
x(2) −−−−−−→
(α,j2,k2)
x(3) · · ·x(L−1) −−−−−−→
(α,jL,kL)
x(L) −−−−→
(β,m¯,l)
y
γ2 :x −−−−−→
(β,m¯,k)
y(1) −−−−−−→
(α,j1,k1)
y(2) −−−−−−→
(α,j2,k2)
y(3) · · · y(L−1) −−−−−−→
(α,jL,kL)
y(L) −−−−→
(β,i,l)
y
Then, we have I(n)(γ1) ≥ I
(n)(γ2) and a similar statement holds for a path with transitions of α agents from
i to k and m¯ to l and transitions of α agents from m¯ to k and from i to l.
Proof. We find that
I(n)(γ1) = c
(n)(x, xβ,i,k) + c(n)(xβ,i,k, x(β,i,k)(α,j1,k1)) + c(n)(xβ,i,k, x(β,i,k)(α,j2,k2))
+ · · · c(n)(xβ,i,k, x(β,i,k)(α,jL,kL)) + c(n)(x(L), (x(L))(β,m¯,l)).
I(n)(γ2) = c
(n)(x, xβ,m¯,k) + c(n)(xβ,m¯,k, x(β,m¯,k)(α,j1,k1)) + c(n)(xβ,m¯,k, x(β,m¯,k)(α,j2,k2))
+ · · · c(n)(xβ,m¯,k, x(β,m¯,k)(α,jL,kL)) + c(n)(x(L), (x(L))(β,i,l))
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from the fact that c(n)(x(l), (x(l))α,jl,kl) = c(n)(xβ,i,k, x(β,i,k)(α,jl,kl)) for l = 2, · · · , L−1 and c(y(l), (y(l))α,jl,kl) =
c(n)(yβ,m¯,k, x(β,m¯,k)(α,jl,kl)) for l = 2, · · · , L−1 (see Lemma B.2). Observe that c(n)(x, xβ,m¯,k) = c(n)(x, xβ,i,k)
and c(n)(x(L), (x(L))(β,i,l)) = c(n)(x(L), (x(L))(β,m¯,l)). Then by applying Lemma 2 successively, we obtain the
desired result.
We can also collect the same transitions as follows, analogously to Proposition 3.3. We also denote by
(β, m¯, k; η) the consecutive transitions of β-agent from m¯ to k η-times.
Proposition B.2. Consider the following paths:
γ : x −−−−−−→
(β,m¯,k;η)
xβ,m¯,k;η −−−−→ y · · · z −−−−−−→
(β,m¯,k;ρ)
zβ,m¯,k;ρ
γ′ : x −−−−−−→
(β,m¯,k;η)
xβ,m¯,k;η −−−−−−→
(β,m¯,k;ρ)
x(β,m¯,k;η)(β,m¯,k;ρ) −−−−→ yβ,m¯,k;ρ · · · zβ,m¯,k;ρ
γ′′ : x −−−−−→ yβ,k ¯,m;η · · · zβ,k,m¯;η −−−−−−→
(β,m¯,k;η)
z −−−−−−→
(β,m¯,k;ρ)
zβ,m¯,k;ρ
where · · · denotes the same transitions. Then either
I(n)(γ′) > I(n)(γ) > I(n)(γ′′), I(n)(γ′′) > I(n)(γ) > I(n)(γ′), or I(n)(γ′′) = I(n)(γ) = I(n)(γ′)
holds. A similar statement holds for a path involving transitions of α agents’ transitions.
Proof. We start with the following lemma.
Lemma B.2. We have the following results:
c(n)(x, xα,i,j) = c(n)(z, zα,i,j) for all xβ = zβ
c(n)(x, xβ,i,j) = c(n)(z, zβ,i,j) for all xα = zα
Proof. This is immediate from the definition.
Next we show the following lemma.
Lemma B.3. We have the following results:
η[c(n)(aβ,m¯,k,ρ, bβ,m¯,k,ρ)− c(n)(a, b)] + ρ[c(n)(aβ,k,m¯,η, bβ,k,m¯,η)− c(n)(a, b)] = 0
Proof. Suppose that (a, b) = (a1, a2, · · · , aT ) where aT = b. Suppose that at+1 = (at)
β,it,lt . Then by
applying Lemma B.2, we obtain
η[c(n)(aβ,m¯,k,ρt , (a
β,m¯,k,ρ
t )
β,it,lt)− c(n)(at, a
β,it,lt
t )] + ρ[c
(n)(aβ,k,m¯,ηt , (a
β,k,m¯,η
t )
β,it,lt)− c(n)(at, a
β,it,lt
t )] = 0
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We next suppose that at+1 = (at)
α,it,lt .
η[c(n)(aβ,m¯,k,ρt , (a
β,m¯,k,ρ
t )
α,it,lt)− c(n)(at, a
α,it,lt
t )] + ρ[c
(n)(aβ,k,m¯,ηt , (a
β,k,m¯,η
t )
α,it,lt)− c(n)(at, a
α,it,lt
t )
=η[πα(m¯, a
β,m¯,k,ρ
t )− πα(lt, a
β,m¯,k,ρ
t )− πα(m¯, at) + πα(lt, at)]
+ ρ[πα(m¯, a
β,k,m¯,η
t )− πα(lt, a
β,k,m¯,η
t )− πα(m¯, at) + πα(lt, at)]
=0
Thus we find
η[I(n)(γaβ,m¯,k,ρ→bβ,m¯,k,ρ)− I
(n)(γa→b)] + ρ[I
(n)(γaβ,k,m¯,η→bβ,k,m¯,η )− I(γa→b)]
=
T−1∑
t=1
η[c(n)(at
β,m¯,k,ρ, (at
β,m¯,k,ρ)it,lt)− c(n)(at, at
β,it,lt)] + ρ[c(n)(at
β,k,m¯,η, (at
β,k,m¯,η)it,lt)− c(n)(at, at
it,lt)]
=0
Lemma B.4. We have the following results:
(i) η[c(n)(xβ,m¯,k;η, x(β,m¯,k;η),(β,m¯,k;ρ))− c(n)(z, z(β,m¯,k;ρ))] + ρ[c(n)(z(β,k,m¯;η), z)− c(n)(x, xβ,m¯,k;η)] = 0
(ii) η[c(n)(x(β,m¯,k;η),(β,m¯,k;ρ), yβ,m¯,k;ρ)− c(n)(xβ,m¯,k;η, y)] + ρ[c(n)(x, yβ,k,m¯;η)− c(n)(xβ,m¯,k,η, y)] = 0
(iii) η[I(n)(γyβ,m¯,k;ρ→zβ,m¯,kρ)− I
(n)(γy→z)] + ρ[I
(n)(γyβ,k,m¯,η→zβ,k,m¯,η)− I
(n)(γy→z)] = 0
Proof. (i) By applying Lemma B.2, we find that
η[c(n)(xβ,m¯,k;η, x(β,m¯,k;η),(β,m¯,k;ρ))− c(n)(z, z(β,m¯,k;ρ))] + ρ[c(n)(z(β,k,m¯;η), z)− c(n)(x, xβm¯,k;η)]
=η[c(n)(x, x(β,m¯,k;ρ) − c(n)(z, z(β,m¯,k;ρ))] + ρ[c(n)(z, z(β,m¯,k;η))− c(n)(x, xβ,m¯,k;η)]
=ηρ[πβ(m¯, x)− πβ(k, x)− πβ(m¯, z) + πβ(k, z)] + ρη[πβ(m¯, z)− πβ(k, z)− πβ(m¯, x) + πβ(k, x)]
=0
(ii) follows from by letting a := xβ,m¯,k;η and b := y in Lemma B.4 and (iii) follows from by letting a := y
and b := z in Lemma B.4.
Proof of Proposition B.2. We find that
η[I(n)(γ′)− I(n)(γ)] + ρ[I(n)(γ′′)− I(n)(γ)]
= η[c(n)(xβ,m¯,k;η, x(β,m¯,k;η),(β,m¯,k;ρ))− c(n)(z, z(β,m¯,k;ρ))] + ρ[c(n)(z(β,k,m¯;η), z)− c(n)(x, xβ,m¯,k;η)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i)
+ η[c(n)(x(β,m¯,k;η),(β,m¯,k;ρ), yβ,m¯,k;ρ)− c(n)(xβ,m¯,k;η, y)] + ρ[c(n)(x, yβ,k,m¯;η)− c(n)(xβ,m¯,k,η, y)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii)
+ η[I(n)(γyβ,m¯,k;ρ→zβ,m¯,kρ)− I
(n)(γy→z)] + ρ[I
(n)(γyβ,k,m¯,η→zβ,k,m¯,η )− I
(n)(γy→z)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(iii)
and Lemma B.4 (i), (ii), and (iii) show the desired result.
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We also define J
(n)
m¯ and K
(n)
m¯ analogously to equations (24) and (26). That is, J
(n)
m¯ is the set of all paths
in which all the transitions are from strategy m¯ and K
(n)
m¯ is the set of all paths consisting of consecutive
transitions from m¯ to some other strategy. From Propositions B.1 and B.2, we next show that the minimum
transition cost path γ involves only transitions from m¯.
Proposition B.3. Suppose that the WBP holds.
(i) We have
min{I(n)(γ) : γ ∈ G
(n)
m¯ } = min{I
(n)(γ) : γ ∈ J
(n)
m¯ }.
(ii) We have
min{I(n)(γ) : γ ∈ G
(n)
m¯ } = min{I
(n)(γ) : γ ∈ K
(n)
m¯ }.
Proof. For the proof, we suppress the superscript (n). Part (i). Let γ ∈ Gm¯\Jm¯. Let the last transition of γ
be from z to zβ,i,l for some i 6= m¯. Since c(n)(z, zβ,i,l) = c(n)(z, zβ,m¯,l), by modifying the last transition from
zβ,i,l to zβ,m¯,l the cost will not be changed. Now, suppose that x is the last state from which a transition
occurs from i 6= m¯ in the modified path (see γ1 in Proposition B.1). Then, by applying Proposition B.1, we
obtain the new path whose last transition is from i 6= m¯ (see γ2 in Proposition B.1). By changing this last
transition again, we can obtain a new modified path. In this way, we can remove all β-agents’ transitions
from i 6= m¯. Similarly, we can also remove all α-agents’ transitions from i 6= m¯ using the corresponding part
for α agents in Proposition B.1. Thus, we can obtain the desired results. Part (ii) immediately follows from
Proposition B.2.
Next, we consider the continuous limit. For this, we define a cost function c¯(p,q), for p = (pα, pβ),q =
(qα, qβ) ∈ ∆α ×∆β . Let q = p+ ρ(e
α
i − e
α
j ) or q = p+ ρ(e
β
i − e
β
j ) for some ρ > 0. If p,q ∈ D¯(em¯),
c¯(p,q) = (pα,j − qα,j)(πα(m¯, p)− πα(j, p)) or c¯(p,q) = (pβ,j − qβ,j)(πβ(m¯, p)− πβ(j, p)).
We similarly define Km¯ as in Definition A.2 and from ζ = ζ(t) ∈ Km¯, where t = ((t
α, tβ); (iα, jβ)) =
(((tα1 , · · · , t
α
K), (t
β
1 , · · · , t
β
K)); (i
α
1 , · · · , i
α
K); (j
β
1 , · · · , j
β
K)) and define ω(t) =
∑K−1
s=0 c¯(p
(s),p(s+1)). Then, we
have the following lemma.
Lemma B.5. Let t¯β, iα, jα be fixed. Then ω(·, t¯β) is affine. A similar statement holds for the case where
t¯α is fixed.
Proof. Suppose that tαi is associated with α agents’ transitions from m¯ to i. Similarly, t
β
j is associated with
β agents’ transitions from m¯ to j. Let p be the state from which the transitions represented by tαi start.
Then we find that
∂ω
∂tαi
= (πα(m¯, pβ)− πα(i, pβ)) + t¯
β
i (−A
β
ii +A
β
im¯ −A
β
m¯m¯ +A
β
m¯i)
+
∑
j 6=i
t¯βj (−A
β
ij +A
β
im¯ −A
β
m¯m¯ +A
β
m¯j)
and observe that πα(m¯, pβ)− πα(i, pβ) depends only on t¯
β; this shows that ω(·, t¯β) is affine.
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Thus, we similarly consider
min{ω(t) : ζ(t) ∈ Km¯}.
Using the characterization that ω is affine, we show that if tα
∗
i > 0 in an optimal path, then πβ(m¯,q
∗(t∗)) =
πβ(i,q
∗(t∗)) at the exit point q∗(t∗), where tα
∗
i denotes the transition by an α-agent from strategy m¯ to i.
Proposition B.4. Suppose that Condition B holds. Then, there exists ζ(t∗) ∈ Km¯ such that ω(t
∗) =
min{ω(t) : ζ(t) ∈ Km¯} and if t
α∗
i > 0, then πβ(m¯,q(t
∗)) = πβ(i,q(t
∗)) and if tβ
∗
j > 0, then πα(m¯,q(t
∗)) =
πα(j,q(t
∗)), where q(t∗) is the end state of ζ(t∗).
Proof. Let t∗ be given such that ω(t∗) = min{ω(t) : ζ(t) ∈ Km¯}. Suppose that t
α∗
i > 0. The other case
follows similarly. Let t¯αi such that
πβ(m¯, (1 − t¯
α
i )e
α
m¯ + t¯
α
i e
α
i ) = πβ(i, (1− t¯
α
i )e
α
m¯ + t¯
α
i e
α
m¯)
Then, we have
πβ(i, qα(t
α∗)) − πβ(m¯, qα(t
α∗))
=πβ(i− m¯, (1− t
α∗
i )e
α
m¯ + t
α∗
i e
α
i ) +
∑
l 6=i
tα
∗
l πβ(i− m¯, e
α
l − e
α
m¯)
=πβ(i− m¯, (1− t
α∗
i )e
α
m¯ + t
α∗
i e
α
i ) +
∑
l 6=i
tα
∗
l (A
β
li −A
β
lm¯ −A
β
m¯i +A
β
m¯m¯). (B.1)
Now, we have two cases:
Case 1: tα
∗
i = t¯
α
i .
Since t∗ ∈ Km¯, πβ(i, qα(t
α∗)) − πβ(m¯, qα(t
α∗)) ≤ 0, the second term in (B.1) (
∑
l 6=i t
α∗
l (A
β
li − A
β
lm¯ − A
β
m¯i +
Aβm¯m¯)) is non-positive. Also, the WBP implies that the same term is non-negative, and hence zero. Thus,
we have πβ(i, qα(t
α∗)) = πβ(m¯, qα(t
α∗)), which is the desired result. Case 2: 0 < tα
∗
i < t¯
α
i .
Suppose that
πβ(m¯, qα(t
α∗)) > πβ(i, qα(t
α∗)). (B.2)
and
πβ(m¯, qα(t
α∗)) = πβ(j1, qα(t
α∗)), πβ(m¯, qα(t
α∗)) = πβ(j2, qα(t
α∗)), · · · , πβ(m¯, qα(t
α∗)) = πβ(jL, qα(t
α∗)),
(B.3)
where the other constraints for πβ are non-binding. We regard equations in (B.3) as a set of linear equations
in variables, tj1 , tj2 , · · · , tjL . Then, from our assumption of the existence of all kinds of mixed-strategy
Nash equilibria, we can find functions t∗j1(ti), t
∗
j2
(ti), · · · , t
∗
jL
(ti) satisfying (B.2) and (B.3) for all ti ∈
[tα
∗
i − ǫ, t
α∗
i + ǫ] for some ǫ > 0. Observe that t
∗
j1
(ti), t
∗
j2
(ti), · · · , t
∗
jL
(ti) are affine in ti. Then, we define
φ(ti) = ω((ti, t
∗
j1
(ti), t
∗
j2
(ti), · · · , t
∗
jL
(ti), t¯i1 , t¯i2 , · · · , t¯iL′ ), t¯
β). From Lemma B.5, we see that φ(ti) is affine
with respect to ti. We then find φ
′ and again have two cases.
Case 2-1. Suppose that φ′ = 0. Then, by increasing ti up to πβ(m¯,q(tα)) = πβ(i,q(tα)), we can find t
∗∗
which satisfies ω(t∗∗) = ω(t∗) and obtain the desired properties in the proposition.
Case 2-2. Suppose that φ′ 6= 0. Then, we have either φ(tα
∗
i − ǫ) > φ(t
α∗
i ) > φ(t
α∗
i + ǫ) or φ(t
α∗
i − ǫ) <
φ(tα
∗
i ) < φ(t
α∗
i + ǫ), in contradiction to the optimality of t
∗.
Let K∗m¯ be the set of all paths in Km¯ that satisfy the conditions in Proposition B.4. Then, we obviously
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have
min{ω(t) : t ∈ K∗m¯} = min{ω(t) : t ∈ Km¯}
Next, suppose that q∗ is the exit point of the minimum escaping path. If πβ(m¯,q
∗) = πβ(i,q
∗) for some i,
then πα(m¯,q
∗) > πα(l,q
∗) for all l and vice versa. This is because if πβ(m¯,q
∗) = πβ(i,q
∗) and πα(m¯,q
∗) =
πα(l,q
∗), then we can always construct the escaping path with a smaller cost by removing α-agents’ (or
β-agents’) transitions. Thus, Proposition B.4 implies that if πβ(m¯,q
∗) = πβ(i,q
∗) for some i, tα
∗
j = 0 for all
j.
Proposition B.5 (One-population mistakes). Suppose that Condition B holds. Then there exists t∗ such
that ω(t∗) = min{ω(t) : t ∈ K∗m¯} and t
∗ involves only mistakes of one population.
Proof. Let t∗ that satisfies Proposition B.4 be given. Suppose that tα
∗
i > 0. The other case follows similarly.
Then, by Proposition B.4, πβ(m¯,q
∗) = πβ(i,q
∗) for some i. From the remarks before the proposition, we
have πα(m¯,q
∗) > πα(l,q
∗) for all l. Again, Proposition B.4 implies that tβ
∗
l = 0 for all l.
Finally, we have the following result.
Proposition B.6. Suppose that Condition B holds. Then there exists t∗ such that min{ω(t) : ζ(t) ∈ K∗m¯}
and
tα
∗
k > 0 for some k and t
α∗
k = 0 for all k 6= l
or
tβ
∗
k > 0 for some k and t
β∗
k = 0 for all k 6= l
Proof. Suppose that the minimum cost escaping path involves only one population, say α-population, by
Proposition B.5. Then, xβ = e
m¯
β for all x in the minimum cost escaping path. Thus we have πα(i, x) =
πα(j, x) for all i, j 6= m¯ and for all x in the minimum cost escaping path. The costs of intermediate states in
the minimum cost escaping path are the same; the WBP implies that the minimum cost escaping path lies
in at the boundary of the simplex, yielding the desired result.
Now the proof for Theorem 4.1 follows from Proposition B.6.
C. Stochastic stability
C.1. Sufficient conditions for stochastic stability: the maximin criterion
In this section, we examine the problem of finding a stochastically stable state (Foster and Young, 1990).
When β = ∞, the strategy updating dynamic is called an unperturbed process, where each convention
becomes an absorbing state for the dynamic. For all β <∞, since the dynamic is irreducible, there exists a
unique invariant measure. As the noise level becomes negligible (β → ∞), the invariant measure converges
to a point mass on one of the absorbing states, called a stochastically stable state. One popular way to
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identify a stochastically stable state is the so-called “maxmin criterion”6; when some sufficient conditions
are satisfied, this method, along with our results on the exit problem (Theorems 3.1 and 4.1), provides the
characterization of stochastic stability. Alternatively, we can directly determine the costs of transitions from
one convention to another, as explained in Section C.2.
To study stochastic stability, we have to find a minimum cost path from one convention to another. More
precisely, we fix conventions i and j. For one-population models, we let the set of all paths from convention
i to j be
L
(n)
i,j : = {γ : γ = (x0, · · · , xT ) andx0 = ei, xt+1 = (xt)
k,l, for some k, l, for all t < T − 1,
xT ∈ D(ej) for some T > 0}.
We define a similar set for two-population models. We then consider the following problem:
C
(n)
ij := min{I
(n)(γ) : γ ∈ L
(n)
i,j }. (C.1)
Again, when n is finite, C
(n)
ij is complicated, involving many negligible terms; we thus study the stochastic
stability problem at n = ∞, which again provides the asymptotics of the invariant measure and stochastic
stability when n is large. We let
Cij = lim
n→∞
1
n
C
(n)
ij (C.2)
and C be a |S| × |S| matrix whose elements are given by Cij for i 6= j (we set an arbitrary number if i = j).
Having solved the problems in equation (C.1) (and (C.2)), the standard method to find a stochastically
stable state is to construct an i− rooted tree with vertices consisting of the absorbing states and whose cost
is defined as the sum of all costs between the absorbing states connected by edges. Then, the stochastic
stable state is precisely the root of the minimal cost tree from among all possible rooted trees (see Young
(1998b) for more details). In principle, to find a minimal cost tree (hence a stochastically stable state),
we need to explicitly solve the problem in equation (C.1). However, in many interesting applications such
as bargaining problems, the minimum cost estimates of the escaping path in Theorem 3.1 are sufficient to
determine stochastic stability without knowing the true costs of transition between conventions; this method
is called the “maxmin” criterion (see the papers cited in footnote 6; see also Proposition C.1 below). More
precisely, we define the incidence matrix of matrix C, Inc(C), as follows:
(Inc(C))ij :=

1 if j = argminl 6=i Cil0 otherwise
In words, the incidence matrix of C has 1 at the i-th and j-th position if the minimum of elements in the
ith row achieves at the i-th and j-th position, and 0 otherwise. We also say that the incidence matrix of C
contains a cycle, (i, i1, i2, · · · , it−1, i), if
Inc(C)ii1Inc(C)i1i2 · · · Inc(C)it−1i > 0
for t ≥ 2. Observe that we can obtain a graph by connecting the vertices of conventions i, j whose (Inc(C))ij
is 1. Also, Inc(C) always contains a cycle and hence the graph contains the corresponding cycle. If this
6See Young (1993b, 1998b); Kandori and Rob (1998); Binmore et al. (2003); Hwang et al. (2016)
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cycle is unique, by removing an edge from the cycle, we can obtain a tree; this is a candidate tree to the
problem of finding a minimal cost tree. Now, we are ready to state some known sufficient conditions to
identify stochastic stable states.
Proposition C.1 (Binmore et al. (2003)). Let i∗ ∈ argmaximinj 6=i Cij . Suppose that either
(i) maxj 6=i Cji∗ < minj 6=i Ci∗j
or
(ii) Inc(C) has a unique cycle containing i∗.
Then i∗ is stochastically stable.
Proof. See Binmore et al. (2003)
The sufficient conditions (i) and (ii) for stochastic stability in Proposition C.1 are called the “local
resistance test” and “naive minimization test,” respectively (Binmore et al., 2003). If strategy i pairwisely
risk-dominates strategy j (i.e., Aii − Aji > Ajj − Aji), then under the uniform mistake model, Cij > 1/2
and Cji < 1/2 hold. Thus, if strategy i
∗ pairwisely risk-dominates all strategies (called a globally pairwise
risk-dominant strategy), then Ci∗j > 1/2 for all j 6= i and Cji∗ < 1/2 for all j 6= i. Thus condition (i)
in Proposition C.1 holds and i∗ is stochastically stable (see Theorem 1 in Kandori and Rob (1998) and
Corollary 1 in Ellison (2000)).
The number minj 6=i Cij in Proposition C.1 is, as mentioned, often called the “radius” of convention i;
this measures how difficult it is to escape from convention i (Ellison, 2000). Proposition C.1 shows that if
either (i) or (ii) holds, the state with the greatest radius (and hence the state most difficult to escape) is
stochastically stable. To check whether either condition (i) or (ii) holds, clearly it is enough to know that
minj 6=i Cij ,maxj 6=i Cji etc.
An important consequence of our main theorem on the exit problem (Theorem 3.1) is that it provides
the lower and upper bounds of the radius of convention i, minj 6=i Cij , as follows. On the one hand, a path
escaping from convention i to j (in L
(n)
i,j ) by definition exits the basin of attraction of convention i and thus
L
(n)
i,j ⊂ G
(n)
i in equation (22). Thus,
C
(n)
ij = min{I
(n)(γ) : γ ∈ L
(n)
i,j } ≥ min{I
(n)(γ) : γ ∈ G
(n)
i }, (C.3)
and Theorem 3.1 shows that
lim
n→∞
1
n
min{I(n)(γ) : γ ∈ G
(n)
i } = min
j 6=i
Rij . (C.4)
Then equations (C.3) and (C.4) together give a lower bound for minj 6=i Cij . On the other hand, if γi→j is
the straight line path from convention i to j ending at the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium involving i and
j, we have
I(n)(γi→j) ≥ min{I
(n)(γ) : γ ∈ L
(n)
i,j } = C
(n)
ij (C.5)
and
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(n)(γi→j) = Rij . (C.6)
Thus, equations (C.5) and (C.6) give an upper bound for minj 6=i Cij . These are the main contents of the
following proposition.
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Proposition C.2. Suppose Condition A or Condition B holds. Then
(i) Cij ≤ Rij for all i, j.
(ii) minj 6=i Cij = minj 6=iRij .
(iii) argminj 6=iRij ⊂ argminj 6=i Cij for all i.
Proof. We obtain (i) by dividing equation (C.5) by n , taking the limit, and using (C.6). For (ii), from
equations (C.3) and (C.4), limn→∞
1
n
C
(n)
ij ≥ minj 6=iRij , implying that minj 6=i Cij ≥ minj 6=i Rij . Also
from (i), we have minj 6=i Cij ≤ minj 6=iRij . Thus, (ii) follows. We next prove (iii). Suppose that j
∗∗ ∈
argminj 6=iRij and j
∗ ∈ argminj 6=i Cij . Then from (i) and (ii), Rij∗∗ = Cij∗ ≤ Cij∗∗ ≤ Rij∗∗ . Thus
j∗∗ ∈ argminj 6=i Cij and we have argminj 6=iRij ⊂ argminj 6=i Cij .
The immediate consequence of Proposition C.2 is that argmaximinj 6=i Cij = argmaximinj 6=iRij and
maxj 6=i Cji ≤ maxj 6=iRji. Further, if argminj 6=i Cij is unique for all i, from Proposition C.2, the incidence
matrices of C and R are the same. In general, argminj 6=i Cij may not be unique for some i. In this case,
Proposition C.2 (iii) implies that if Rij = 1, then Cij = 1, which, in turn, implies that whenever R yields a
graph containing a unique cycle, C yields the same graph containing the unique cycle. These facts enable
us to replace C in Proposition C.1 by R—a |S| × |S| matrix consisting of Rijs (again, we assign arbitrary
numbers at the diagonal positions). This is our main result on stochastic stability.
Theorem C.1 (Stochastic Stability). Suppose that Condition A or Condition B holds. Let i∗ ∈
argmaximinj 6=iRij . Suppose also that either
(i) maxj 6=iRji∗ < minj 6=iRi∗j
or
(ii) Inc(R) has a unique cycle containing i∗.
Then, i∗ is stochastically stable.
Proof. Let i∗ ∈ argmaximinj 6=iRij . From Proposition C.2 (iii), i
∗ ∈ argmaximinj 6=i Cij . We first suppose
that (i) holds. Now, Propositions C.2 (i) and C.2 (ii) imply that
max
j 6=i∗
Cji∗ ≤ max
j 6=i∗
Rji∗ < min
j 6=i∗
Ri∗j = min
j 6=i∗
Ci∗j .
Thus, Proposition C.1 implies that i∗ is stochastically stable. Now, suppose that (ii) holds. From Proposition
C.2 (iii) and the remarks before Theorem C.1, Inc(C) contains a unique cycle containing i∗, too. Thus,
Proposition C.1 again implies that i∗ is stochastically stable.
Note that two-strategy games trivially satisfy both conditions (i) and (ii) in Theorem C.1. Here, we can
easily check that the stochastic stable state is the risk-dominant equilibrium. In particular, Kandori and Rob
(1998) show that when a coordination game exhibits positive feedback (the marginal bandwagon property),
a “globally pairwise risk-dominant equilibrium” is stochastically stable under the uniform mistake model
(see also Binmore et al. (2003)). However, when the number of strategies exceeds two, Theorem C.1 shows
that stochastically stable states under the logit choice rule do not necessary satisfy the criterion of pairwise
risk dominance. To summarize, Theorem C.1 asserts that when either condition (i) or condition (ii) is
satisfied, the state with the largest radius (and hence the most difficult state to escape) is stochastically
stable, in line with the existing results for uniform interaction models. However, the radius now depends on
the opportunity cost of individuals’ mistakes as well as the threshold number of agents inducing others to
play a new best-response.
47
1γ
*γ
2γ
*γ
Panel A Panel B Panel C
x
y
z
1,2D∂
2,1D∂
Figure C.7: Illustrations of ∂D1,2, ∂D2,1 and Lemmas C.1 and C.2
C.2. The direct computation of transition costs for stochastic stability
In this subsection, we explain how to apply our comparison principles to directly compute the transition
costs in equation (C.1) directly (see Sandholm and Staudigl (2016) for similar results from a completely
different approach). We present the results for a three-strategy game A and, without loss of generality,
assume that B
(1)
23 = −A12+A21−A23+A32−A31+A13 > 0 (otherwise, we relabel the strategies). Because
of the complicated geometry for games with more than three strategies, we focus only on three-strategy
games; however, we believe that the problem in equation (C.1) for games with more than three strategies
can be solved similarly using a proper modification and an extension of our following arguments.
For a given three-strategy game, we are interested in estimating the minimum costs for transitions from
convention 1 to convention 2 and to convention 3; that is,
min
γ
{I(n)(γ) : γ ∈ L1,2}, min
γ
{I(n)(γ) : γ ∈ L1,3}.
Let m¯,m¯′, and j be distinctive strategies. We define a set of states that belong to the boundary of the
basin of attraction of convention i as follows:
∂D
(n)
i,j = {x ∈ D
(n)(ei) : x
i,j ∈ D(n)(ej)}.
(see Figure C.7 Panel A for i = 1, j = 2 and i = 2, j = 1.) We first consider the class of paths lying entirely
in D(n)(e1) which start from some state x ∈ D
(n)(e1) and reach D
(n)(e3). Let such a path γ1 be given
(see Panel B in Figure C.7). Recall that the MBP implies that it always costs less to first switch away
from strategy 1 and then to switch away from the other strategy (comparison principle 1 in Proposition
3.1). Thus, applying this principle repeatedly, we can modify γ1 to obtain a lower cost path, γ
∗, which
only involves transitions from strategy 1 in the interior of D(n)(e1), and then move along the boundary (if
necessary). This procedure yields the following lemma.
Lemma C.1. Suppose that x ∈ D(n)(em¯). There exists γ
∗ satisfying
I(n)(γ∗) = min{I(n)(γ) : γ = (x1, · · · , xT ), x1 = x, xT ∈ D
(n)(em¯′), γ ∈ D
(n)(em¯)}
and (1) γ∗ only involves transitions from m¯ → m¯′, m¯ → j, or j → m¯′, and (2) if y → yj,m¯
′
exists in γ∗,
then y, yj,m¯
′
∈ ∂D
(n)
m¯,j.
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Proof. See Appendix C.3.
In addition, for the problem of estimating the minimum costs of transitions from convention 1 to con-
vention 3, a path can reach ∂D
(n)
1,2 or ∂D
(n)
2,1 before entering D
(n)(e3). Thus, we need to estimate the costs of
some paths that start from a state in the boundary set ∂D
(n)
1,2 (or ∂D
(n)
2,1 ) and lie in the interior of D
(n)(e1) (or
D(n)(e2)), and then return to a state in ∂D
(n)
1,2 (or ∂D
(n)
2,1 ). In Panel C of Figure C.7, we show an example of
such a path, denoted by γ2. The path, γ2, which starts from y must involve a transition from strategy i 6= 1
in order to go through the interior of D(n)(e1). In addition, since γ2 returns to ∂D
(n)
1,2 , it must later involve
a transition from strategy 1. Then, the comparison principle 1 in Proposition 3.1 implies that interchanging
these two transitions yields a (strictly) lower cost path. This implies that γ2 cannot be the minimum cost
path. The following lemma states this result.
Lemma C.2. Let y, z ∈ ∂D
(n)
m¯,j, ym¯′ < zm¯′ , and γ
∗ be such that
I(n)(γ∗) = min{I(n)(γ) : x1 = y, · · · , xT = z, xt ∈ D
(n)(em¯) for all t}
Then γ∗ only involves transitions from m¯ to m¯′ or from j to m¯′ and if a transition from m¯ to m¯′, w → wm¯,m¯
′
,
occurs, then w,wm¯,m¯
′
∈ ∂D
(n)
m¯,j.
Proof. See Appendix C.3.
Observe that in Lemma C.2 if we take m¯ = 1, m¯′ = 3 and j = 2, we obtain the result for paths traveling in
the interior of D(n)(e1) (as in Panel C of Figure C.7), while if we take m¯ = 2, m¯
′ = 3 and j = 1, the result
holds for paths traveling in the interior of D(n)(e2). In the latter case, the minimum cost path in Lemma
C.2 lies in ∂D
(n)
2,1 .
From Lemmas C.1 and C.2, we can find candidate minimum cost paths that involve transitions from 1
in the interior of D(n)(e1), and that may involve transitions between states in ∂D
(n)
1,2 or ∂D
(n)
2,1 (see Panel A
in Figure C.8). More precisely, we define a path, γ, as follows:
γ = (x1, · · · , xT ) =


xt+1 = (xt)
m¯,k for k = j, m¯′ if 1 ≤ t ≤ t1
xt ∈ ∂D
(n)
m¯,j ∪ ∂D
(n)
j,m¯ if t1 + 1 ≤ t ≤ T
xT ∈ D(em¯′)
(C.7)
where 1 < t1 ≤ T and no transition from m¯
′ to m¯ nor from m¯′ to j occurs at ∂D
(n)
m¯,j ∪ ∂D
(n)
j,m¯. Let the class
of paths satisfying (C.7) be
K
(n)
m¯,m¯′ = {γ : γ is given by (C.7) for some t1, T }.
In Panel B in Figure C.8, we illustrate how to obtain a path in K
(n)
m¯,m¯′ from a given path γ from convention 1
to convention 3. The path γ in Panel B in Figure C.8 enters D(n)(e2) before it reaches D
(n)(e3) and Lemma
C.1 shows that a path from point C to point D through states in ∂D
(n)
1,2 can achieve a lower cost than the
part of γ going to C′. In addition, Lemma C.2 (applied for m¯ = 2, m¯′ = 3, and j = 1) shows that a path
from point A to point B through states in ∂D
(n)
2,1 can achieve a lower cost than the part of γ going A
′. By
repeating these arguments, we obtain the following proposition.
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Figure C.8: Paths in K
(n)
m¯,m¯′ and illustration of Theorem C.3
Panel A Panel B
Convention 1
transition from 1 to 3 transition from 1 to 2
Convention 1
Convention 2 Convention 3
1 3γ →
Convention 2 Convention 3
1 2γ →
1 2 3γ → →
Figure C.9: Illustration of Theorem C.2. Panels A and B illustrate Theorem C.2. The shaded regions
show the basins of attraction of the alternative conventions.
Proposition C.3. We have
min{I(n)(γ) : γ ∈ K
(n)
m¯,m¯′} = min{I
(n)(γ) : γ = (x1, · · · , xT ), x1 = em¯ and xT ∈ D(em¯′)}.
Proof. See Appendix C.3.
For the final step of determining the minimum cost transition path from convention 1 to convention 2 and
to convention 3, we consider an infinite population limit for the same reason given in the exit problem, and
then reduce the number of candidate minimum paths further. To state this formally, let q∗ be the complete
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, and let p(1,2)∗ (or p(1,3)∗) be the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium involving
strategy 1 and strategy 2 (or strategy 3). We define three piece-wise linear paths, γ1→2, γ1→3,and γ1→2→3,
as follows (see Figure C.9):
γ1→2 : e1 → p
(1,2)∗, γ1→3 : e1 → p
(1,3)∗, γ1→2→3 : e1 → p
(1,2)∗ → q∗
To obtain Theorem C.2, we again use theMBP and the condition −A12+A13+A21−A23−A31+A12 > 0.
The latter condition is related to comparison principle 2 (Propositions 3.2 and 3.3) and implies that path
γ : x → x1,2 → x(1,2),(1,3) has a lower cost than that of path γ′ : x → x1,3 → x(1,2),(1,3). In particular, this
implies that a path on a dotted line in Panel B of Figure C.9 cannot be an optimal path.
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Theorem C.2. Suppose that −A12+A13+A21−A23−A31+A12 > 0. Then, we have the following results:
lim
n→∞
1
n
min
γ
{I(n)(γ) : γ ∈ L1,3} = min{c¯(γ1→2→3), c¯(γ1→3)} (C.8)
lim
n→∞
1
n
min
γ
{I(n)(γ) : γ ∈ L1,2} = c¯(γ1→2), (C.9)
where
c¯(γ1→2→3) = c¯(γ1→2) +
1
2
(p
(1,2)∗
1 − q
∗
1 + p
(1,2)∗
2 − q
∗
2)(π(1, p
(1,2)∗)− π(3, p(1,2)∗)) (C.10)
and p(1,2)∗ is the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of strategies 1 and 2, q∗ is the complete mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium, and the expression in (C.10) follows from Lemma C.3.
Proof. See Appendix C.4.
C.3. Proofs of Lemma C.1, Lemma C.2, and Proposition C.3
Proof of Lemma C.1. Let i 6= m¯. Suppose that γ = (x1, · · · , xT ), x1 = x, xT ∈ D
(n)(em¯′), γ ∈ D
(n)(em¯).
From γ, we will construct γ∗ satisfying the desired property.
Step A: Let the last transition be x → xi,l, where i 6= m¯, xi,l ∈ D(n)(em¯′) (i.e., π(m¯
′, xi,l) > π(m¯, xi,l)).
Consider x→ xm¯,l. Then
π(m¯′ − m¯, xm¯,l) = π(m¯′ − m¯, xi,l +
1
n
(ei − em¯))
= π(m¯′ − m¯, xi,l) +
1
n
[(Am¯m¯ −Am¯′m¯)− (Am¯i −Am¯′i)] > 0
Thus xm¯,l ∈ D(n)(em¯′). Since c
(n)(x, xm¯,l) = c(n)(x, xi,l), we modify the last transition and obtain an equal
cost path. We then proceed to Step B.
Step B: Choose t largest such that xt = w
i,k and xt+1 = w
(i,k),(m¯,l),
w → wi,k → w(i,k),(m¯l) (C.11)
where l 6= m¯. If k = m¯, we replace the transitions in (C.11) by w → wi,l. If wi,l ∈ D(n)(em¯′), go to Step A.
If wi,l 6∈ D(n)(em¯), then the last transition is still from m¯ and then go to Step B. If i = l, then we replace
w → wi,k → w(i,k),(m¯,l) by w → wm¯,k and then go to Step B. Thus we suppose that k 6= m¯ and i 6= l.
Case 1: wm¯,k ∈ D(n)(em¯). We then replace (C.11) by
w → wm¯,k → w(m¯,k),(i,l)
If w(m¯,k),(i,l) ∈ D(n)(em¯′), then we go to Step A and modify the last transition. If w
(m¯,k),(i,l) 6∈ D(n)(em¯′),
then go to Step B.
Case 2: wm¯,k ∈ D(n)(em¯′). Then we modify w → w
i,k → w(i,k),(m¯,l) by w→ wm¯,k and go to Step B.
Case 3: wm¯,k ∈ D(n)(ej). In this case, we first show that l 6= j. Suppose that l = j. Then
π(j − m¯, w(m¯,k),(i,l)) = π(j − m¯, wm¯,k) +
1
n
(Ajj −Am¯j − (Aji −Am¯i)) > 0,
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since wm¯,k ∈ D(n)(ej). Thus w
(m¯,k),(i,l) ∈ D(n)(ej), which is a contradiction. Since there are three strategies
m¯, m¯′, j, we must have l = m¯′, i = j and k = m¯′ (since k 6= i, m¯), which implies that wm¯,m¯
′
∈ D(n)(ej). We
next show that w ∈ ∂D
(n)
m¯,j and w
j,m¯′ ∈ ∂D
(n)
m¯,j. First, w ∈ ∂D
(n)
m¯,j holds, since
π(j − m¯, wm¯,j) = π(j − m¯, wm¯,m¯
′
− em¯′ + ej) = π(j − m¯, w
m¯,m¯′) +
1
n
[(Ajj −Am¯j)− (Ajm¯′ −Am¯m¯′)] > 0
and wj,m¯
′
∈ D
(n)
m¯,j since w
m¯,m¯′ ∈ D(n)(ej). Thus, a transition from w (from j to m¯
′) occurs at ∂D
(n)
m¯,j .
Also, the immediate prior transition to w cannot be from m¯′ to m¯ or from j to m¯ (if a transition from
m¯′ to m¯ occurs, the state leading to w, wm¯,m¯
′
, belongs to D(n)(em¯), which is a contradiction to the fact
wj,m¯
′
∈ ∂D
(n)
m¯,j . If a transition from j to m¯ occurs, again the state leading to w, w
m¯,j belongs to D(n)(em¯),
which is again contradiction to the fact w ∈ ∂D
(n)
m¯,j). Thus the immediate prior transition to w is j → m¯
′,
m¯ → m¯′, or m¯ → j. Suppose that the immediate prior transition (say from y) to w is j → m¯′. Then
y = wm¯
′,j and
π(j − m¯, ym¯,j) = π(j − m¯, w(m¯
′,j),(m¯,j)) = π(j − m¯, wm¯,j) +
1
n
(Ajj −Am¯j − (Ajm¯′ −Am¯m¯′)) > 0
Thus y ∈ ∂D
(n)
m¯,j . The we proceed to find a prior transition to y. If the prior transition is again from j → m
′,
the same argument shows that this transition belongs to ∂D
(n)
m¯,j. If the prior transition is either m¯→ m¯
′ or
m¯→ j and we go to Step B.
By repeating this argument, we see that in the resulting path, γ∗ only involves transitions from m¯→ m¯′,
m¯ → j, or j → m¯′. Also if a transition from y → yjm¯
′
occurs, Case 3 in Step B occurs and thus
y, yjm¯
′
∈ ∂D
(n)
m¯,j .
Proof of Lemma C.2. Let y ∈ D(n)(em¯) and γ be such that I
(n)(γ) = min{I(n)(γ) : x1 = y, · · · , xT =
z, xt ∈ D
(n)(em¯) for all t}. We first show that
(i) γ does not contain the following transition:
w → wi,k → w(i,k),(m¯,j) (C.12)
for i 6= m¯ and k 6= i.
(ii) If γ contains the following transition
w→ wi,k → w(i,k),(m¯,m¯
′) (C.13)
for i 6= m¯ and k 6= i, then i = j and k = m¯′ and wi,k, w(i,k),(m¯,m¯
′) ∈ ∂D
(n)
m¯,j .
For (i) If i = j, k = m¯′ or i = m¯′, k = m¯, we replace (C.12) by w → w(i,k),(m¯,j) and obtain a strictly lower
cost path, which is a contradiction. Thus, we suppose that i = m¯′, k = j.
We first show that wm¯,j 6∈ D(n)(ej). Suppose that w
m¯,j ∈ D(n)(ej). Then
π(j − m¯, wm¯,j) = π(j − m¯, w(m¯
′,j),(m¯,j))−
1
n
(Ajj −Ajm¯′ −Am¯m¯′ +Am¯j)
If π(j−m¯, wm¯,j) > 0, then π(j−m¯, w(m¯
′,j),(m¯,j)) > 0, which is a contradiction. If w(m¯,j) ∈ D(n)(em¯), we then
replace (C.12) by w → wm¯,k → w(m¯,k),(i,j) and obtain a strictly lower cost path, which is a contradiction.
If w(m¯,j) ∈ D(n)(em¯′), then we construct a path γ˜ ending with w → w
m¯,j such that I(n)(γ˜) < I(n)(γ).
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Then γ˜ is a path from x to D(n)(em¯′). By Lemma C.1, we choose a minimum cost path γ
∗ from y to
D(n)(em¯′). Then I
(n)(γ∗) ≤ I(n)(γ˜). Then, since γ∗ goes through y, we obtain γ¯ from γ∗ such that
I(n)(γ¯) ≤ I(n)(γ∗) < I(n)(γ). This is a contradiction to the optimality of γ.
For (ii). If i = m¯′, k = j or i = m¯′, k = m¯, we replace (C.13) by w → w(i,k),(m¯,m¯
′′) and obtain a strictly
lower cost path, which is a contradiction. Thus we suppose that i = j, k = m¯′. If wm¯,m¯
′
∈ D(n)(em¯), then we
replace (C.13) by w → wm¯,m¯
′
→ w(j,m¯
′),(m¯,m¯′) and obtain a strictly lower cost path. If wm¯,m¯
′
∈ D(n)(ej),
then wj,m¯
′
∈ ∂D
(n)
m¯,j . Also if x ∈ D
(n)(ej), then x
j,m¯′ ∈ ∂D
(n)
m¯,j since
π(j − m¯, x(j,m¯
′)(m¯,j)) = π(j − m¯, xm¯,m¯
′
) = π(j − m¯, x) +
1
n
[Am¯m¯ −Ajm¯ −Am¯m¯′ −Ajm¯′ ].
Thus wm¯,m¯
′
∈ D(n)(ej) implies that w
(m¯,m¯′)(j,m¯′) = w(j,m¯
′),(m¯,m¯′) ∈ ∂D
(n)
m¯,j. From this, the results (i) and
(ii) follow.
Now we show that γ does not contain a transition from m¯ to j. Suppose that γ contains a transition
from m¯ to j. Choose the smallest t such that xt = o and xt+1 = o
m¯,j. Because of (i), the previous transition
must be from m¯ to m¯′. Suppose that there are ρ number of (consecutive) transitions from m¯ to m¯′. Then,
since γ starts from y ∈ ∂D
(n)
m¯,j, we must have transitions, w → w
i,k → w(i,k),(m¯,m¯
′) leading to o (otherwise,
since y = o+ ρ
n
(em¯ − em¯′), w 6∈ ∂D
(n)
m¯,j and π(m¯− j, o
m¯,j) > 0,
π(m¯− j, ym¯,j) = π(m¯− j, om¯,j) +
1
n
π(m¯− j, em¯ − em¯′).
implies that y 6∈ ∂D
(n)
m¯j , which is a contradiction.) Thus by (ii), we have i = j, k = m¯
′ and w(i,k)(m¯m¯
′) =
w(j,m¯
′)(m¯m¯′) ∈ ∂D
(n)
m¯,j . We will show that w
(j,m¯′)(m¯m¯′) ∈ ∂D
(n)
m¯,j is a contradiction. Suppose that we have
transitions
w→ wj,m¯
′
→ w(j,m¯
′),(m¯,m¯′;ρ) = o→ om¯,j
Let v = wm¯,m¯
′
. Then o = wj,m¯
′
+ ρ
n
(em¯′−em¯) and o
m¯,j = o− 1
n
(em¯−ej). Thus we have v = o+
ρ
n
(em¯−em¯′)
and vm¯ > om¯, vj ≤ oj , vm¯′ ≤ om¯′ and π(m¯− j, o) > 0. Then we have
π(m¯− k, v) = π(m¯− k, em¯)− π(m¯− k, em¯ − ej)vj − π(m¯− k, em¯ − em¯′)vm¯′ ≥ π(m¯− k, o) > 0
for k = j, m¯′. Thus v = wm¯,m¯
′
∈ D(n)(em¯). Since w
(j,m¯)(m¯,m¯′)(m¯,j) = wm¯,m¯
′
, this is a contradiction to the
fact that w(j,m¯)(m¯,m¯
′) ∈ ∂D
(n)
m¯,j . Thus γ cannot contain a transition from m¯ to j.
Next we show that a transition from m¯ to m¯′ cannot occur in D(n)(em¯)\∂D
(n)
m¯,j . Suppose that a transition
from m¯ to m¯′ occurs in ∂D(n)(em¯)\∂D
(n)
m¯,j and choose the smallest t such that xt = o and xt+1 = o
m¯,m¯′ .
Then by (ii), the previous transition must be from m¯ to j. However, a transition from m¯ to j cannot occurs
in γ∗. Thus, in γ, there is no transition from m¯ to j and all transitions from m¯ to m¯′ must occur in ∂D
(n)
m¯,j
and satisfy (ii). From this, we obtain the desired result.
Proof of Proposition C.3. To reduce notational clutter, we fix m¯ = 1, j = 2 and, m¯′ = 3. However,
the same results holds for any choices of m¯, j, and m¯′. Let γ∗ be a path satisfying (C.3). Suppose that
γ∗ ∈ D(n)(em¯). If γ
∗ crosses itself, we can obtain a strictly lower path by removing redundant transitions,
thus we suppose that γ∗ does not cross. Then Lemma C.1 implies that γ ∈ K(n). Now suppose that
γ∗ 6∈ D(n)(e1).
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Figure C.10: An oblique path in Lemma C.3
Case 1: xT−1 ∈ D
(n)
1,3 and xT ∈ D
(n)(e3). Then γ
∗ must go through a point in ∂D
(n)
1,2 , exitD
(n)(e1), and enter
again D(n)(e1). Choose the largest τ1 such that xτ1 ∈ ∂D
(n)
1,2 . We apply Lemma C.1 for m¯ = 1, m¯
′ = 3, j = 2,
obtaining a new lower cost path which belongs to K(n). Also since γ∗ start from e1, then it must be the case
that γ∗ enters D(n)(e2) through ∂D
(n)
2,1 .
Step 1: Let τ2 be the largest number such that xτ2 := z ∈ ∂D
(n)
2,1 and τ3 < τ2 be the largest such that
xτ3 := y ∈ ∂D
(n)
2,1 . Then γ
∗ does not cross itself, we must have y3 < z3. Then, Lemma C.2 (applied
for m¯ = 2, m¯′ = 3, j = 1) implies that γ∗ belongs to K(n). Then since γ starts from e1, there must a
state prior to xτ3 which belongs to ∂D
(n)
1,2 . Let τ4 < τ3 be the largest number such that xτ4 ∈ ∂D
(n)
1,2 and
xτ4−1 ∈ ∂D
(n)(e1)\∂D
(n)
1,2 . We will show that a transition leading to w = xτ4 is either from 1 to 2 or from 1
to 3. By our choice of τ4 only possible transitions leading to w are from 1 to 2 or from 1 to 3, or from 3 to
2. Suppose that the transition leading to x is from 3 to 2 (i.e., w2,3 → w). Since γ∗ enters ∂D
(n)
2,1 from w,
γ contains either w → w1,3 or w1,2 → w1,3. Thus if we replace w2,3 → w by w2,3 → w1,3, then we obtain
a strictly lower cost path, which is a contradiction. Thus the transition leading to w is either from 1 to 3
or from 1 to 2. Now Suppose that all states before xτ4 belong to ∂D
(n)(e1). If there exist transition from 2
or 3, then we use (i) and (ii) in the proof of Lemma C.2 and obtain a contradiction. Thus γ∗ ∈ K(n). If
all states before xτ4 do not belong to ∂D
(n)(e1), it must be the case that γ enters ∂D
(n)(e2) through ∂D
(n)
2,1
before xτ4 . Then we repeat Step 1. In this way, we show that γ
∗ ∈ K(n).
Case 2: xT−1 ∈ ∂D
(n)
2,3 and xT ∈ D
(n)(e3). Then choose the largest t such that xt ∈ ∂D
(n)
2,1 and apply
Lemma C.1 for m¯ = 2, m¯′ = 3, j = 1, obtain a new lower cost path, which is a contradiction. If γ enter
D(n)(e1) before xτ4 , then we similarly apply Lemma C.2 and obtain a contradiction. We choose x ∈ D
(n)(e1)
such that all states before x belong to D(n)(e1). we apply a similar procedure as in Case 1.
Finally, suppose that γ∗ contains a transition from 3 to k, w → w3,k for k = 1 or 2 in D1,2. Then
because of the previous steps, there exists a transition, o→ ok,3 = w1,2 ∈ ∂D
(n)
2,1 . Then replacing w → w
3,k
by w → w1,2 yields a strictly lower cost path, which is a contradiction. Similarly, γ∗ cannot contain a
transition from 3 to k, w → w3,k for k = 1 or 2 in ∂D
(n)
2,1 . Thus, we obtain desired results.
C.4. The cost minimum path at n =∞: The proof of Theorem C.2
Here, we first compute the cost of the following path.
Lemma C.3 (Cost of oblique paths). Suppose that x(n), y(n) ∈ ∆ such that y = x + M a
n
(em¯′ − ej) +
M b
n
(em¯′ − em¯) for some non-negative integers, M
(n), a, b and distinct m¯, m¯′, j. Let x(n) → p and y(n) → q
and γx(n)→y(n) be the path described in Figure C.10. Then we have
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(n)(γx(n)→y(n)) =
1
2
(pm¯′ − qm¯′)(π(m¯, p+ q)− π(m¯
′, p+ q)).
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Figure C.11: Paths to be compared.
where pm¯′ − qm¯′ = pm¯ − qm¯ + pj − qj.
Proof. We let zι1,ι2 := x
(n) + ι1
a
n
(em¯′ − ej) + ι2
b
n
(em¯′ − em¯) and c˜(z, z
′) := 12 (zl − z
′
l)π(m¯ − m¯
′, z + z′) for
z′ = z + α(em¯′ − el) for l = m¯, j. From Lemma A.2, limn→∞
1
n
I(γz→z′) = c˜
(n)(z, z′). Observe that we have
M(n)∑
ι=1
zι−1,ι−1 =
M (n) + 1
2
(x+ y)− y,
M(n)∑
ι=1
zι,ι =
M (n) + 1
2
(x+ y)− x,
M(n)∑
ι=1
zι,ι−1 =
M (n) + 1
2
(x+ y)− x−
b
n
M(em¯′ − em¯).
Using this, we find that
M(n)∑
ι=1
c˜(n)(zι−1,ι−1, zι,ι−1) + c˜
(n)(zι,ι−1, zι,ι)
=
1
2
a
n
M∑
ι=1
[π(m¯− m¯′, zι−1,ι−1) + π(m¯− m¯
′, zι,ι−1)] +
1
2
b
n
M∑
ι=1
[π(m¯− m¯′, zι,ι−1) + π(m¯− m¯
′, zι,ι)]
=
1
2
M (n)
n
a
n
π(m¯− m¯′, (x(n) + y(n))) +
1
2
M (n)
n
b
n
π(m¯− m¯′, (x(n) + y(n))) +Rn (C.14)
where Rn → 0 as n→∞.
Now since x(n) → p, y(n) → q, M (n) a
n
→ pj − qj , and M
(n) b
n
→ pm¯ − qm¯, from (C.14) we find that
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(n)(γx(n)→y(n)) = lim
n→∞
M∑
ι=1
[c˜(n)(zι−1,ι−1, zι,ι−1) + c˜
(n)(zι,ι−1, zι,ι)] =
1
2
(pm¯′ − qm¯′)π(m¯ − m¯
′, p+ q).
We also show the following cost comparison (see Figure C.11). Let γ1 : r→ q and γ2 : r → p→ q where
p, q, r are given by
p := r + α(ej − em¯), q = p+ α(em¯′ − ej) + β(em¯′ − em¯)
where α > 0, β > 0 and satisfies
π(m¯, p) = π(j, p), π(m¯, q) = π(j, q), π(m¯, r) > π(j, r) (C.15)
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Observe that
q = r + α(ej − em¯) + α(em¯′ − ej) + β(em¯′ − em¯) = r + (α+ β)(em¯′ − em¯).
Lemma C.4. Suppose that the MBP holds. We have
c¯(r, q) > c¯(r, p) + c¯(p, q)
if and only if
−Am¯j +Am¯m¯′ +Ajm¯ −Ajm¯′ −Am¯′m¯ +Am¯′j > 0.
Proof. From the costs of two paths (Lemma C.3) and equation (C.15), we find that
c¯(r, q) =
1
2
(α+ β)(π(m¯, r + q)− π(m¯′, r + q))
c¯(r, p) =
1
2
α(π(m¯, r + p)− π(j, r + p))
c¯(p, q) =
1
2
(α+ β)(π(m¯, p+ q)− π(m¯′, p+ q))
Thus we find that
c¯(r, q)− [c¯(r, p) + c¯(p, q)] =
1
2
(α+ β)π(m¯ − m¯′, r − p)−
1
2
α(π(m¯ − j, r))
From r − q = (α+ β)(em¯ − em¯′) and π(m¯, q) = π(j, q), and r − p = α(em¯ − ej), we find that
π(m¯− j, r) = (α+ β)(Am¯m¯ −Ajm¯ −Am¯m¯′ +Ajm¯′ )
π(m¯−m′, r − p) = α(Am¯m¯ −Am¯′m¯ − (Am¯j −Am¯′j))
Thus we find that
c¯(r, q)− [c¯(r, p) + c¯(p, q)] =
1
2
α(α+ β)(−Am¯j +Am¯m¯′ +Ajm¯ −Ajm¯′ −Am¯′m¯ +Am¯′j) > 0
which gives the desired result.
The proof of Theorem C.2. Let γ be the cost minimum path given by (C.8). Then γ∗ cannot involve
transition from 1 to 3 and then from 1 to 2, because from −A12 +A13 +A21 −A23 −A31 +A12 > 0 we can
obtain a strictly lower cost path. From the results for the finite n, except for γ1→3 and γ1→2→3 the following
two kinds of paths can be the lower cost path:
(i): e1
1→2
−−−→ v
1→3
−−−→ p, where v2 ≤ q
∗
2 , and π(1, p) = π(3, p)
(ii): e1
1→2
−−−→ w
1→3
−−−→ p′
oblique
−−−−→ q∗, where w2 ≥ q
∗
2 , and π(1, p
′) = π(2, p′).
Theorem 3.1(the exit problem) shows that γ1→3 has lower cost than the path in (i). Also, Lemma C.4 shows
that γ∗1→2→3 has a lower cost than (ii). From this we obtain the first result.
Next, let γ be the cost minimum path given by (C.9). Similarly, from the results for the finite n, except
56
for γ1→2 and γ1→2→3 the following two kinds of paths can be the lower cost path:
(i) : e1
1→3
−−−→ v
1→2
−−−→ p, where v3 ≤ q
∗
3 and π(1, p) = π(2, p)
(ii) : e1
1→3
−−−→ w
1→2
−−−→ p′
oblique
−−−−→ q∗, where w3 ≥ q
∗
3 and π(1, p
′) = π(3, p′)
Then again Theorem 3.1 shows that γ1→2 has a lower cost than the path in (i). For the path, γ1 in (ii),
Then we consider the following alternative paths:
γ2 :e1
1→3
−−−→ o
1→2
−−−→ q∗, where o3 = q
∗
3
γ3 :e1
1→2
−−−→ u
1→3
−−−→ q∗, where u2 = q
∗
2
Then since −A13+A12+A31−A32−A21+A23 < 0 , in Lemma C.4 for m¯ = 1, j = 3, m¯
′ = 2 c¯(r, q) < c¯(r, p)+
c¯(p, q) holds. Thus we find that c¯(γ1) > c¯(γ2) and also again from −A12+A13+A21−A23−A31+A12 > 0,
c¯(γ2) > c¯(γ3) and Theorem 3.1 again implies c¯(γ3) > c¯(γ1→2). From this, we obtain the result in (C.9).
D. Stochastic stable states for Nash demand games
Recall that
RUmj := min{(A
β
mm − A
β
mj)
(Aαmm −A
α
jm)
(Aαmm −A
α
jm) + (A
α
jj −A
α
mj)
, (Aαmm −A
α
j¯m)
(Aβmm −A
β
mj)
(Aβmm −A
β
mj) + (A
β
jj −A
β
jm)
}
and
(Aαij , A
β
ij) :=

(δi, f(δj)), if i ≤ j(0, 0), if i > j
Then we divide cases:
(i) m < j. We find that
Aβmm = f(δm), A
β
mj = f(δj), A
α
mm = δm,A
α
jm = 0, A
α
jj = δj, A
α
mj = δm
and
Aαmm = δm,A
α
jm = 0, A
β
mm = f(δm), A
β
mj = f(δj), A
β
jm = 0, A
β
jj = f(δj)
Using these, we find that
(Aβmm −A
β
mj)
Aαmm −A
α
jm
Aαmm −A
α
jm + (A
α
jj −A
α
mj)
= (f(δm)− f(δj))
δm
δj
and
(Aαmm −A
α
jm)
Aβmm −A
β
mj
Aβmm −A
β
mj + (A
β
jj −A
β
jm)
= δm
f(δm)− f(δj)
f(δm)
.
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(ii) m > j. We find that
Aβmm = f(δm), A
β
mj = 0, A
α
mm = δm,A
α
jm = δj, A
α
jj = δj, A
α
mj = 0
and
Aαmm = δm,A
α
jm = δj, A
β
mm = f(δm), A
β
mj = 0, A
β
jm = f(δm), A
β
jj = f(δj)
Using these, we find that
(Aβmm −A
β
mj)
Aαmm −A
α
jm
Aαmm −A
α
jm + (A
α
jj −A
α
mj)
= f(δm)
δm− δj
δm
and
(Aαmm −A
α
jm)
Aβmm −A
β
mj
Aβmm −A
β
mj + (A
β
jj −A
β
mj)
= (δm− δj)
f(δm)
f(δj)
.
Thus we have
RUmj =

(f(δm)− f(δj))
δm
δj
∧ δm f(δm)−f(δj)
f(δm) if m < j
f(δm) δm−δj
δm
∧ (δm− δj) f(δm)
f(δj) if m > j
Or
RUmj = min
m<j
{(f(δm)− f(δj))
δm
δj
∧ δm
f(δm)− f(δj)
f(δm)
} ∧min
m>j
{f(δm)
δm− δj
δm
∧ (δm− δj)
f(δm)
f(δj)
}.
Note that we have
RImj = min
m<j
{δm
f(δm)− f(δj)
f(δm)
} ∧min
m>j
{f(δm)
δm− δj
δm
}.
Then we would like find minj R
U
mj . To do this, we first have the following lemma.
Lemma D.1. Suppose that f(x) ≥ 0, f ′(x) < 0 and f ′′(x) < 0 for all x. Let y be given.
(i) f
′(x)
f(x) is decreasing in x.
(ii) xf ′(x)− f(x) is decreasing in x.
(iii) f ′(x) + f(x)
x
is decreasing in x.
(iv) f ′(x) + ( f(x)
x
)2 is decreasing in x.
(v) (f(y)− f(x)) y
x
is increasing in x
(vi) (y − x) f(y)
f(x) is decreasing in x.
Proof. (i)-(iv) are easily verified by taking derivatives. We show (v). (vi) follows similarly. Let ϕ(x) :=
(f(y)− f(x)) y
x
. We find that
ϕ′(x) = y
−f ′(x)x + f(x)− f(y)
x2
Then since −f ′(x)x + f(x) is increasing in x, we have
−f ′(x)x + f(x)− f(y) ≥ f(0)− f(y) ≥ 0
since f is decreasing. Thus ϕ′(x) > 0.
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Thus using Lemma (D.1), we find that
min
j
RUmj = min{(f(δm)− f(δ(m+ 1)))
δm
δ(m+ 1)
, δm
f(δm)− f(δ(m+ 1))
f(δ(m))
, f(δm)
δ
δm
, δ
f(δm)
f(δ(m− 1))
}
We let
r1(m) := (f(δm)− f(δ(m+ 1)))
δm
δ(m+ 1)
, r2(m) := δm
f(δm)− f(δ(m+ 1))
f(δ(m))
and
l1(m) := f(δm)
δ
δm
, l2(m) := δ
f(δm)
f(δ(m− 1))
.
Lemma D.2. We have the following results:
(i) r1 and r2 are increasing in m.
(ii) l1 and l2 are decreasing in m.
Proof. (i). Since f ′′ < 0, f(δm)− f(δ(m+ 1)) is increasing. Since δm
δ(m+1) is increasing, two terms in r1 are
both positive and increasing, hence r1 is increasing. Also since f
′′ < 0, f(δ(m+1))
f(δm) is decreasing in m. Thus
r2 is increasing.
Then r1 and r2 are increasing in m and l1 and l2 are decreasing in m.
Lemma D.3. Suppose that
m∗ ∈ argmax
m
min
j
RUmj
Then for all m < m∗, minj R
U
mj = R
U
m,m+1 and for all m > m
∗, minj R
U
mj = R
U
m,m−1
Proof. Let Rˆ(m) := minj R
U
mj . We show that
If m < m∗, then Rˆ(m) = r1(m) or r2(m)
If m > m∗, then Rˆ(m) = l1(m) or l2(m)
and then the desired results follow. We show the first claim. (the second claim follows similarly). Let
m < m∗ and Rˆ(m) = l1(m). Then since l1(m) is decreasing in m, l1(m) > l1(m
∗) and by definition, we have
Rˆ(m∗) ≤ l1(m
∗). Thus we have
min
j
RUmj = Rˆ(m) = l1(m) > l1(m
∗) ≥ Rˆ(m∗)
which is contradiction to m∗ ∈ argmaxmminj R
U
mj If Rˆ(m) = l2(m), the exactly same argument leads to a
contradiction. Thus if m < m∗, then Rˆ(m) = r1(m) or r2(m).
Let s∗ and sI such that
−f ′(s∗) =
f(s∗)
s∗
and − f ′(sI) = (
f(sI)
sI
)2
and for µ ∈ [0, s¯α
δ
] ∩ R, let µI = µI(δ), µ∗ = µ∗(δ), and µ∗∗ = µ∗∗(δ) such that
r1(µ
∗) = l1(µ
∗), r2(µ
∗∗) = l2(µ
∗∗) and r2(µ
I) = l1(µ
I). (D.1)
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Lemma D.4. We have the following results. As δ → 0,
δµ∗(δ)→ s∗, δµ∗∗(δ)→ s∗, δµI(δ)→ sI .
Proof. For δµ∗(δ)→ s∗, let
ϕδ(x) :=
(f(x)− f(x+ δ))
δ
x2
(x+ δ)f(x)
, ϕ(x) := −f ′(x)
x
f(x)
.
Then ϕδ converge uniformly to ϕ and ϕδ(δµ
∗(δ)) = r1(µ
∗)
l1(µ∗)
= 1 and ϕ(x∗) = 1. Then the uniform convergence
of ϕδ to ϕ implies that δµ
∗(δ)→ s∗. The second and third parts follow similarly.
Next we show that
Lemma D.5. We have the following result.
(i) If s∗ > sE, then s∗ > sI > sE and −f ′(sI) s
I
f(sI ) < 1 and −f
′(s∗) < 1
(ii) If s∗ < sE, then s∗ < sI < sE and −f ′(sI) s
I
f(sI) > 1 −f
′(s∗) > 1
Proof. We show (i) and (ii) follows similarly. Suppose that s∗ > sE . Let sI ≥ s∗. Since from Lemma D.1
−f ′(x) − f(x)
x
is increasing, we have
−f ′(sI)−
f(sI)
sI
≥ −f ′(s∗)−
f(s∗)
s∗
= 0 = −f ′(sI)− (
f(sI)
sI
)2
which implies that
f(sI)
sI
≥ 1 =
f(sE)
sE
Since f(s)
s
is decreasing in s, we have
sE ≥ sI ≥ s∗ > sE
which is a contradiction. Now suppose that sI ≤ sE . Then since sE < s∗,
−f ′(sI)−
f(sI)
sI
< −f ′(s∗)−
f(s∗)
s∗
= 0 = −f ′(sI)− (
f(sI)
sI
)2
which implies that
f(sI)
sI
< 1.
which is a contradiction to f(s
I )
sI
≥ f(s
E)
sE
= 1 from sI ≤ sE . Now from s∗ > sI and s∗ > sE , respectively we
have
−f ′(sI)
sI
f(sI)
< 1 and − f ′(s∗) < 1.
Lemma D.6. We have the following results.
(i) If s∗ > sE, then there exists δ such that for all δ < δ, µ∗ > µI and
r1(µ
I) < r2(µ
I) = l1(µ
I) and r1(µ
∗) < l2(µ
∗)
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where µI = µI(δ) and µ∗ = µ∗(δ) are defined in (D.1).
(ii) If s∗ < sE, then there exists δ such that for all δ < δ, µ∗∗ < µI and
l2(µ
I) < r2(µ
I) = l1(µ
I) and l2(µ
∗∗) < r1(µ
∗∗)
where µI = µI(δ) and µ∗ = µ∗(δ) are defined in (D.1).
Proof. We first prove (i). Suppose that s∗ > sE . From Lemma D.5, we have
− f ′(sI)
sI
f(sI)
< 1 and − f ′(s∗) < 1 (D.2)
Since δµI → sI (Lemma D.4) and sI < s∗ and from (D.2)
r1(µ
I)
l1(µI)
→ −f ′(sI)
sI
f(sI)
< 1,
there exists δ such that for all δ < δ, r1(µ
I) < l1(µ
I) and µI < µ∗. For the second inequality r1(µ
∗) < l2(µ
∗)
similarly follows from
r1(µ
∗)
l2(µ∗)
< 1 ⇐⇒
f(δµ∗)− f(δ(µ∗ + 1))
δ
δµ∗
δ(µ∗ + 1)
f(δ(µ∗ − 1))
f(δµ∗)
< 1
and
r1(µ
∗)
l2(µ∗)
→ −f ′(s∗) < 1
from (D.2).
Next we show (ii). Similarly to (i), from Lemma D.5, we have we have
−f ′(sI)
sI
f(sI)
> 1 and f ′(s∗) > 1
Then we have
l2(µ
I)
r2(µI)
< 1 ⇐⇒
δ
f(δµI)− f(δ(µI + 1))
f(δµI)
f(δ(µI − 1))
f(δµ)
δµ
< 1
and
l2(µ
∗∗)
r1(µ∗∗)
< 1 ⇐⇒
δ
f(δµ∗∗)− f(δ(µ∗∗ + 1))
δ(µ∗∗ + 1)
δµ∗∗
f(δµ∗∗)
f(δ(µ∗∗ − 1))
< 1
and from these, (ii) follows.
Lemma D.7. Suppose that µ∗ is given by (D.1).
(i) If s∗ > sE, then
µ∗ ∈ arg max
µ∈[0, s¯
δ
]
min{r1(µ), r2(µ), l1(µ), l2(µ)}
(ii) If s∗ < sE, then
µ∗∗ ∈ arg max
µ∈[0, s¯
δ
]
min{r1(µ), r2(µ), l1(µ), l2(µ)}
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Figure D.12: Determinations of stochastically stable states. For Panel A, f(x) =
√
1− x3 for x ∈ [0, 3],
δ = 0.01. For Panel B, f(x) =
√
3(1− x), for x ∈ [0, 1], δ = 0.01.
Proof. Let s∗ > sE . Choose δ satisfying Lemma D.6. Then for all δ < δ, we have
r1(µ
∗) = l1(µ
∗) < l1(µ0) = r2(µ0) < r2(µ
∗)
and thus r1(µ
∗) ≤ min{r2(µ
∗), l1(µ
∗), l2(µ
∗)}. Now, if µ < µ∗ then r1(µ
∗) > r1(µ) since r1(·) is increasing.
If µ > µ∗, then r1(µ
∗) = l1(µ
∗) > l1(µ) since l1(·) is decreasing. Thus we have
r1(µ
∗) ≥ min{r1(µ), r2(µ), l1(µ), l2(µ)}
for all µ ∈ [0, s¯
δ
]. This shows that
µ∗ ∈ arg max
µ∈[0, s¯
δ
]
min{r1(µ), r2(µ), l1(µ), l2(µ)}
Now let s∗ < sE . Again choose δ satisfying Lemma D.6. Then for all δ < δ, we have
r2(µ
∗∗) = l2(µ
∗∗) < r1(µ
∗∗) < r1(µ
I) = l1(µ
I) < l1(µ
∗∗)
and similarly since r2 is increasing and l2 is decreasing, we obtain the desired result.
Thus we have the following result.
Theorem D.1. Consider the logit choice rule. There exists δ such that for all δ < δ, the stochastic stable
state mst(δ) converges to sNB: i.e.,
δmst(δ)→ sNB
where
−f ′(sNB) =
f(sNB)
sNB
.
Proof. Choose δ satisfying Lemma D.6. Let δ < δ. If s∗ > sE , then pick mst(δ) to be the integer closest to
µ∗(δ) in (D.1). If s∗ < sE , the pick mst(δ) to be the integer closest to µ∗∗(δ). Then Lemma D.3, Lemma
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α favored transition β favored transition Stochasticstability
β mistake (A) α mistake (B) β mistake (C) α mistake (D)
Uniform δm
s¯−α
∆f(δm)
f(δm)
δ
δm
f(δm)
f(δ)
Unintentional
Intentional © ©
∆f(δm)
f(δm) ≈
δ
δm
Logit
Unintentional ∆f(δm)
δm
δ(m+1) δm
∆f(δm)
f(δ(m)) f(δm)
δ
δm
δ f(δm)
f(δ(m−1))
sNB > sE © △ © ∆f(δm) δm
δ(m+1) ≈ f(δm)
δ
δm
sNB < sE © △ © δm∆f(δm)
f(δ(m)) ≈ δ
f(δm)
f(δ(m−1))
Logit
Intentional © © δm
∆f(δm)
f(δ(m)) ≈ f(δm)
δ
δm
Table D.2: Comparison of solutions under various mistake models. ∆f(δm) := f(δm) − f(δ(m + 1)).
Resistances are determined by the minimum of A,B,C, and D. In the rows tilted with “unintentional”,
“intentional”, sNB > sE , sNB < sE , and “logit intentional” show the smaller ones. Thus under the logit
unintentional dynamic, when sNB > sE , the transition always occurs by β population, while sNB < sE ,
the transition always occurs by α population. Entries marked by △ and © occurs in the minimal tree, but
entries marked by © are only binding and hence determining the stochastic stable convention.
D.7 and Theorem C.1 show that mst(δ) is a stochastically stable state. Since µ∗(δ), µ∗(δ) → s∗, we have
δmst(δ)→ s∗ = sNB and obtain the desired result.
Theorem D.2. Consider the intentional logit choice rule. There exists δ such that for all δ < δ, the
stochastic stable state mst(δ) converges to sI : i.e.,
δmst(δ)→ sI
where
−f ′(sI) = (
f(sI)
sI
)2.
Proof. Under the intentional logit choice rule, we have
min
j
RImj = min{δm
f(δm)− f(δ(m+ 1))
f(δm)
, f(mδ)
δ
mδ
}
Then the exactly same argument as for the unintentional logit choice rule shows the desired result.
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